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Oughts and ends

Bibliographic Data

ID8104473
AuthorsStephen Finlay (0000-0001-7533-5188, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume143
Issue3
Pages315-340
Publication date2008-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1007/s11098-008-9202-8
OpenAlexW1968835945
LanguageEN
Citations received18
References cited28

This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed

Categorical variable · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Linguistics · Machine learning · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Rhetorical question · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence · Philosophy

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    Open Access•Jean Hampton, Jean E Hampton•Authority of Reason•1998

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  • The Sources of Normativity

    Open Access•Christine M Korsgaard, Onora O’neill et al.•Sources of Normativity•1996

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    Open Access•G E M Anscombe•Philosophy•1958

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    Open Access•Mark Schroeder•Philosophical Perspectives•2004

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Unique citing works18
Citations per year1,13
Citation span2010 - 2026 (17)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 18

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