Oughts and ends
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8104473 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stephen Finlay (0000-0001-7533-5188, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 143 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 315-340 |
| Publication date | 2008-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-008-9202-8 |
| OpenAlex | W1968835945 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 28 |
This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed
Categorical variable · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Linguistics · Machine learning · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Rhetorical question · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence · Philosophy
Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist
Entangled Normativity
The Type-B Moral Error Theory
Indeterminacy and Normativity
The many ‘oughts’ of deliberation
Putting oughts together
Weak necessity without weak possibility
Metaethical Contextualism, Triviality and Semantic Blindness
Whither Anankastics
Did It Happen? The Pragmatic Complexity of Veridicality Assessment
Organizational normativity and teleology
A Means-End Account of Explainable Artificial Intelligence
Modality, expected utility, and hypothesis testing
What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it
Ought , Agents, and Actions
Deciding for Others
One Ought Too Many
Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought
The Myth of Morality
The Authority of Reason
What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean
Logic and Ethics
Moral Luck
The Sources of Normativity
The Possibility of Practical Reason
Modern Moral Philosophy
The Scope of Instrumental Reason
The Hypothetical Imperative
The Significance of Sense
Natural Goodness
The hypothetical imperative
Normative Requirements
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Thinking How to Live
| Unique citing works | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,13 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 18 |