The hypothetical imperative
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8077910 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark Schroeder (0009-0006-6949-7686, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 357-372 |
| Publication date | 2005-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048400500191958 |
| OpenAlex | W2065889844 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 15 |
According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don't-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that they are edicts binding only on some—those who have an end
Epistemology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy
Kant, Constitutivism, and the Shmagency Objection
Categories of Freedom as Categories of Practical Cognition
Between ‘Indubitably Certain’ and ‘Quite Detrimental’ to Philosophy
The Conditionality of Hypothetical Imperatives
Instrumental Mythology
From deliberation to participation
Instrumental Rationality
Wide and narrow scope
Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints
Oughts and ends
Why Care about Being an Agent
The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives
Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason
Kant's Theory of Normativity
Kant's Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals a commentary
The Authority of Reason
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Free Agency
The Sources of Normativity
Cudworth and Normative Explanations
The Scope of Instrumental Reason
The Hypothetical Imperative
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
Kant’s Theory of Practical Reason
Normative Requirements
Ethical Consistency Principles
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,71 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2026 (22) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |