Empirical Underdetermination
The Empirical Side of the Duhem-Quine Thesis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079200 |
|---|---|
| Authors | María Caamaño-Alegre (0000-0002-7005-9257, Universidad de Valladolid, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.70022 |
| OpenAlex | W4408384597 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 58 |
Theoretical underdetermination is a central issue in the Philosophy of Science, having been discussed and debated since the early 20th century. The so-called "Duhem-Quine problem" has been used as an umbrella term to refer to a number of problematic features that arise from the lack of a biunivocal correspondence between theory and evidence. However, the now familiar idea that the detection of an empirical phenomenon is inferred from a complex collection of data entails the recognition that not only theories, but also the description of empirical phenomena are underdetermined by evidence. Empirical underdetermination, understood as the underdetermination of evidence (or assumed empirical phenomena) by data, emerges as a major challenge that has yet to be fully recognized and carefully addressed in the philosophy of science. The paper summarizes the distinction between empirical and theoretical underdetermination as it implicitly appears in the literature to date. It presents them as instances of a more general type, both of which arise from the same basic problems, albeit at different levels and with different implications. Important but often overlooked aspects of the empirical/theoretical distinction, the notion of background assumption, and the different roles of evidence will be clarified
Empirical research · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Quine · Underdetermination · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge
An Architectonic for Science
Statistical Inference as Severe Testing
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory
Conjectures and Refutations
On empirically equivalent systems of the world
Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination
Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science
Representing and Intervening
Monist and Pluralist Approaches on Underdetermination
Is structural underdetermination possible
What do patterns in empirical data tell us about the structure of the world
Data and phenomena
From rocks to graphs ? the shaping of phenomena
Lessons from the Large Hadron Collider for model-based experimentation
Duhem’s problem revisited
Against putting the phenomena first
State of the field
On the Locality of Data and Claims about Phenomena
Data, Phenomena, and Reliability
Duhem, Quine, and the Multiplicity of Scientific Tests
Data Models and the Acquisition and Manipulation of Data
Data, Phenomena, Signal, and Noise
What Counts as Scientific Data? A Relational Framework
Towards a Taxonomy of the Model-Ladenness of Data
Saving the Phenomena
Methodological Conservatism
The Naturalists Return
The Duhem Thesis
Saving Unobservable Phenomena
The Fate of Knowledge
Underdetermination, Holism and the Theory/Data Distinction
Underdetermination in science
The Mangle of Practice
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |