Intervening into mechanisms
Prospects and challenges
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079285 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lena Kästner (0000-0002-8747-6911, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, corresponding author), Lise Marie Andersen (0000-0001-8928-6401, Aarhus University) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue | 11 |
| Publication date | 2018-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12546 |
| OpenAlex | W2888540397 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 46 |
In contemporary philosophy of science, the consensus view seems to be that scientific explanations describe mechanisms responsible for the phenomena to be explained. Two kinds of explanatory relevance figure in mechanistic accounts of explanation: causal (etiological) and constitutive. Following prominent accounts, it seems natural to analyze both these relations in terms of systematic interventions into some factor X with respect to another factor Y. However, such interventions are tailored to uncover causal relations only. Construing the constitutive relationship between parts and wholes in terms of interventions thus raises metaphysical, conceptual, and epistemological questions. We here review the barriers that intervention-based inquiry into mechanisms encounters and consider some solutions
Complex Systems and Decision Making · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
Causation, Prediction, and Search
Mind in a Physical World
In Search of Mechanisms
Explaining the Brain
The New Mechanical Philosophy
Mechanisms and the nature of causation
Top-down Causation Without Top-down Causes
What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences
Epiphenomenalism
Reduction in Philosophy of Mind
Explanation
Mechanisms and constitutive relevance
Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms
Mutual manipulability and causal inbetweenness
Explicating Top-Down Causation Using Networks and Dynamics
Thinking about Mechanisms
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation
An Abductive Theory of Constitution
On the Limits of Causal Modeling
Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets
Interventionism and Causal Exclusion
High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist’s ‘Variables Problem’
Constitutive Relevance, Mutual Manipulability, and Fat-Handedness
The Metaphysics of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena
Three Problems for the Mutual Manipulability Account of Constitutive Relevance in Mechanisms
A Regularist Approach to Mechanistic Type-Level Explanation
A Field Guide to Mechanisms
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,83 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2022 (3) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |