God and gratuitous evil (Part II)

Bibliographic Data

ID4079289
AuthorsKlaas J Kraay (0000-0002-6725-9477, Toronto Metropolitan University, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume11
Issue12
Pages913-922
Publication date2016-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12385
OpenAlexW2561312906
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited26

In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not (or probably does not) exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil, and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. The most common response to such arguments attempts to cast doubt on the claim that gratuitous evil really occurs. The focus of these two survey papers will be a different response - one that has received less attention in the literature. This response attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible. If it succeeds, then the occurrence of gratuitous evil does not, after all, count against theism. In the prequel to this paper, I surveyed the literature surrounding the attempts by Michael Peterson and John Hick to execute this strategy. Here, I survey the attempts due to William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, and Michael Almeida, respectively

Appeal · Epistemology · Good and evil · Political ponerology · Theism · Free Will and Agency · Law · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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