The Problem of Natural Evil II
Hybrid Replies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079690 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luke Gelinas (0000-0002-6277-148X, University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 560-574 |
| Publication date | 2009-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00210.x |
| OpenAlex | W2015441295 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 11 |
I consider two views that combine different elements of general theistic replies to natural evil, those of Peter van Inwagen and William Hasker. I end with a Hasker-style defense - one that, unlike Hasker's, denies the existence of pointless natural evils - and some brief observations on the direction of future debate
Archaeology · Art · Epistemology · Literature · Theism · Free Will and Agency · History · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citations per year | 0.18 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2009 - 2021 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |