Three Routes to Contingentism in Metaphysics

Contingentism in Metaphysics

Bibliographic Data

ID4079739
AuthorsKristie Miller (0000-0002-5092-8419, The University of Sydney, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume5
Issue11
Pages965-977
Publication date2010-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00349.x
OpenAlexW1904490938
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited52

Recently, the notion that most metaphysical theses are necessary has been challenged by a number of authors. This article considers two different routes to contingentism in metaphysics. The first is via a combination of conceptual analysis and empirical discoveries; the second is via synthetic metaphysical claims. The last of these has the potential to yield contingent truths if each of competing metaphysical theses turn out to be the best theory in different possible worlds. This article considers each of these routes in turn, and considers the extent to which either yields a tractable epistemology of contingent claims

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Physics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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