Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Why Presidents Sometimes Do Not Use Intelligence Information

Bibliographic Data

ID4290050
AuthorsPatrick S Roberts (0000-0002-8920-0396, The Centers), Robert P Saldin
Year2016
Volume131
Issue4
Pages779-802
Publication date2016-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Science Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3195 • E-ISSN: 1538-165X
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1002/polq.12534
OpenAlexW2561063040
LanguageEN
Citations received3

IMPASSIONED CALLS FOR REFORMING the intelligence process in U.S. foreign policy routinely follow on the heels of high-profile intelligence failures in which the intelligence community or the government as a whole is caught by surprise. These failures are blamed on inadequate warning grounded in organizational, psychological, and informational weaknesses in the intelligence process, as in Pearl Harbor or the failure to “connect the dots” before the 11 September 2001 attacks.1 The reforms that follow usually attempt to reorganize agencies and processes by improving the speed, amount, and accuracy of intelligence information provided to politicians, particularly the president.2 Yet these reforms often fail.3 The reforms might have a better chance of succeeding if reformers understood that policy output does not always flow from intelligence input. Given this disconnect, what may appear to the public or even to Congress as an intelligence failure or a policy failure may be neither from the perspective of the president or the bureaucracy.4 There may be reasons other than a lack of sufficient information as to why no policy action was taken in response to intelligence information, even if the situation seems to call for action. This is a particular version of a larger problem with policy-relevant information. If administrative agencies, think tanks, and scholars produce so much research, why is so little of it used?5 With respect to intelligence information, the reason has to do with the mismatch between the incentives for intelligence producers and consumers. The former are rewarded for satisfying the latter, and the latter often perceive that they will be rewarded for pursuing an agenda that does not always comport with the best available information

Action (physics) · Bureaucracy · Business · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Incentive · Intelligence analysis · Intelligence cycle · Market economy · Military intelligence · Political science · Politics · Process (computing) · Public relations · Surprise · Computer Science · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Law · Psychology · Public Administration · Social Psychology

  • Uncertainty, Intelligence, and National Security Decisionmaking

    David R Mandel, Daniel Irwin•International Journal of…•2021

  • Ambient politicization

    Jeffrey G Karam•Intelligence & National Security•2026

  • Collective Discussion

    Open Access•Hager Ben Jaffel, Alvina Hoffmann et al.•International Political Sociology•2020

Unique citing works3
Citations per year0,5
Citation span2020 - 2026 (7)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 3

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae