Are there exclusionary reasons? An inquiry on a third kind of exclusionary reasons

Bibliographic Data

ID4320429
AuthorsAndrea Faggion (0000-0003-4260-1771, State University of Londrina, Brazil, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume47
Issue2
Publication date2024-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTrans/Form/Ação (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0101-3173 • E-ISSN: 1980-539X
PublisherFapUNIFESP (SciELO) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1590/0101-3173.2024.v47.n2.e02400133
OpenAlexW4399499347
SciELOS0101-31732024000200217
LanguageEN
References cited17

Joseph Raz became well-known for his concept of exclusionary reasons, which he applied in the analysis of various practical concepts, such as decisions, rules and obligations. However, the scholarly literature displays a high degree of skepticism regarding the existence of exclusionary reasons and even the coherence of the concept itself. Throughout his work, Raz consistently focused on two types of exclusionary reasons: directly motivational reasons and evidential ones. The concept has faced numerous criticisms, likely stemming from this particular focus. In this article, I emphasize another category of exclusionary reasons that Raz neglected: reasons that are excluded by their very nature. I argue that this category not only shows that the concept is not empty or inconsistent, but also plays a crucial role in elucidating a significant moral domain, specifically, the domain of affective relationships

Exclusionary Rule · Political science · Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law

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