Humean Nature
How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351237 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Errol Lord (University of Pennsylvania) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 274 |
| Pages | 202-206 |
| Publication date | 2019-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqy033 |
| OpenAlex | W2883092575 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Humean theories of moral psychology explain the phenomena just by appeal to beliefs and desires. Once Humean moral psychology was orthodoxy, but then a revolt against it flourished for several—productive—decades. Now a Humean counter-revolt is under way. Here Neil Sinhababu joins the counter-revolt. I recommend it for those interested in the central notions of moral psychology—desire, intention, moral judgment, and will power. Although it has its quirks, it provides many interesting arguments and is sure to stimulate future discussion. Sinhababu's Humean theory centres on two theses, the Desire-Belief Theory of Action and the Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning: Desire-Belief Theory of Action: One is motivated to A if and only if desire that E is combined with belief that one can raise E’s probability by A-ing. Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning: Desire that M is created as the conclusion of reasoning if and only if the reasoning combines desire that E with belief that M would raise E’s probability. It is eliminated as the conclusion of reasoning if and only if the reasoning eliminates such a combination
Action (physics · Epistemology · Feeling · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Practical reason · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,43 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2021 (3) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |