Errol Lord
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873416 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Errol Lord |
| GIVEN NAMES | Errol |
| FAMILY NAME | Lord |
| SIGNATURE | LORD E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pennsylvania |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Of Soulmates and Old Spouses: How to be a Romantic Kantian about the Ethics of Love
This paper introduces and defends the foundations of a comprehensive Kantian view of the ethics of love, and shows how this relates to the ethics of respect. The view is Kantian insofar as it maintains that everyone shares a feature that makes them lovable. But it maintains that, due to the metaphysics of this feature, particular qualities of people provide reasons for love. This allows us to account for both the stability of lovability whilst al…
To Know Beauty Exactly: The Aims of Eros and Aesthetic Judgment
Edith Landmann-Kalischer’s essays on aesthetics are a remarkable achievement that deserve widespread attention. Here I raise two related problems for her blend of Kantian hedonism with late nineteenth-century enthusiasm for the psychological sciences. First, I argue that she misconstrues the nature of beauty by maintaining that it is possible for it to be the object of science. Second, I argue that her hedonism prevents her from adequately accoun…
In search of lost principles: Generic Generalism in Aesthetics and Ethics
I defend a form of generalism in ethics and aesthetics. Generalism about a domain D is the view that there are principles that play an explanatory role in the metaphysics of D and can be used in reasoning when thinking about D. I argue that in both aesthetics and ethics, there are generic generalizations that are principles. I do this by (i) explaining the nature of a particularly important kind of generic, (ii) argue that generics of this kind p…
What Would Beauty Have to Be In Order to Save the World
Historically beauty has been seen to be one of the highest values. One thread in this tradition maintains that beauty has redemptive or salvific powers, that beauty has the power save, redeem, or transform, both individual lives and the world as a whole. This paper investigates what beauty would have to be in order to have certain salvific powers. The main negative conclusion is that a minimal condition is that the value of beauty be final rather…
Enriched Perceptual Content and the Limits of Foundationalism
This paper is about the epistemology of perceptual experiences that have enriched high-level content. Enriched high-level content is content about features other than shape, color, and spatial relations that has a particular etiology. Its etiology runs through states of the agent that process other perceptual content and output sensory content about high-level features. My main contention is that the justification provided by such experiences (fo…
Précis of The Importance of Being Rational
Replies to Schafer, Schroeder, and Staffel
The Vices of Perception
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons (WKR) problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem relevant for reasons-based analyses. Some have argued that this problem is a general one for many theorists, and claim that this lightens the burden for reasons fundamentalists. We argue in this paper that the rev…
Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling
Humean theories of moral psychology explain the phenomena just by appeal to beliefs and desires. Once Humean moral psychology was orthodoxy, but then a revolt against it flourished for several—productive—decades. Now a Humean counter-revolt is under way. Here Neil Sinhababu joins the counter-revolt. I recommend it for those interested in the central notions of moral psychology—desire, intention, moral judgment, and will power. Although it has its…
The Importance of Being Rational
The Importance of Being Rational systematically defends a novel reasons-based account of rationality. The book’s central thesis is that what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. The book defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons. It is shown that these views not only help to support the book’s main thesis, they also help to resolve…
What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing)
This chapter is about whether we ought to be rational—i.e., whether rationality is normative or deontically significant. Although this is a truism, skepticism about whether we ought to be rational is popular in the wake of very influential work by John Broome and Niko Kolodny. This chapter argues that Reasons Responsiveness vindicates the deontic significance of rationality. It is argued that it is independently plausible that what one deliberati…
Reasons Internalism
This chapter provides an overview of some key arguments on behalf of internalism and externalism, respectively. It looks at how the debate over internalism interacts with the debate over moral rationalism. Moral rationalism, is the view that morality necessarily provides normative reasons. The chapter also provides the discussion of moral rationalism as a general frame to discuss some of the major versions of internalism. Much of the critical dis…
Weighing Reasons
There are often conflicting considerations bearing on what one ought to do or believe. This conflict is often resolved by appealing to facts about the relative weights of these competing considerations. Anyone who might once have looked for exceptionless principles relating options with oughts should look instead for an account of normative reasons and their weight. This volume aims to provide the beginnings of a theory of weight
On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit
On the Rational Power of Aesthetic Testimony
Can one know aesthetic facts on the basis of testimony? Optimists say that we can. Pessimists say that we cannot. Daniel Whiting has recently put forth a new argument for pessimism about the epistemic power of aesthetic testimony. He seeks to establish pessimism by arguing that testimonial beliefs cannot justify the downstream reactions that would otherwise be justified if one had aesthetic knowledge. In this paper, I will show that there is a pl…
Reasons for Belief
Normative reasons have been a central theoretical tool in ethics for several decades. Not so in epistemology. This volume aims to further advance the use of reasons in epistemology. In that aim it succeeds brilliantly. Despite the fact that this volume—like nearly all volumes of its type—has its ups and downs, I recommend it to those who are interested in exploring some of the ways one can use normative reasons to advance debates in epistemology.…
Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality: Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality
It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide‐scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow‐scopers’) that it violates narrow‐scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter‐example to narrow‐scope views. But a narrow‐…
Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason
It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a dilemma. Dancy has the choice between accounting for two plausible constraints while at the same time holding an outlandish philosophy of mind …
On the Rational Power of Aesthetic Testimony
Can one know aesthetic facts on the basis of testimony? Optimists say that we can. Pessimists say that we cannot. Daniel Whiting has recently put forth a new argument for pessimism about the epistemic power of aesthetic testimony. He seeks to establish pessimism by arguing that testimonial beliefs cannot justify the downstream reactions that would otherwise be justified if one had aesthetic knowledge. In this paper, I will show that there is a pl…
What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing)
This chapter is about whether we ought to be rational—i.e., whether rationality is normative or deontically significant. Although this is a truism, skepticism about whether we ought to be rational is popular in the wake of very influential work by John Broome and Niko Kolodny. This chapter argues that Reasons Responsiveness vindicates the deontic significance of rationality. It is argued that it is independently plausible that what one deliberati…
On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit
Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality: Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality
It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide‐scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow‐scopers’) that it violates narrow‐scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter‐example to narrow‐scope views. But a narrow‐…
Replies to Schafer, Schroeder, and Staffel
Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling
Humean theories of moral psychology explain the phenomena just by appeal to beliefs and desires. Once Humean moral psychology was orthodoxy, but then a revolt against it flourished for several—productive—decades. Now a Humean counter-revolt is under way. Here Neil Sinhababu joins the counter-revolt. I recommend it for those interested in the central notions of moral psychology—desire, intention, moral judgment, and will power. Although it has its…
Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason
It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a dilemma. Dancy has the choice between accounting for two plausible constraints while at the same time holding an outlandish philosophy of mind …
Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality: Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality
It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide‐scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow‐scopers’) that it violates narrow‐scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter‐example to narrow‐scope views. But a narrow‐…
Reasons for Belief
Normative reasons have been a central theoretical tool in ethics for several decades. Not so in epistemology. This volume aims to further advance the use of reasons in epistemology. In that aim it succeeds brilliantly. Despite the fact that this volume—like nearly all volumes of its type—has its ups and downs, I recommend it to those who are interested in exploring some of the ways one can use normative reasons to advance debates in epistemology.…
Weighing Reasons
There are often conflicting considerations bearing on what one ought to do or believe. This conflict is often resolved by appealing to facts about the relative weights of these competing considerations. Anyone who might once have looked for exceptionless principles relating options with oughts should look instead for an account of normative reasons and their weight. This volume aims to provide the beginnings of a theory of weight
On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit
On the Rational Power of Aesthetic Testimony
Can one know aesthetic facts on the basis of testimony? Optimists say that we can. Pessimists say that we cannot. Daniel Whiting has recently put forth a new argument for pessimism about the epistemic power of aesthetic testimony. He seeks to establish pessimism by arguing that testimonial beliefs cannot justify the downstream reactions that would otherwise be justified if one had aesthetic knowledge. In this paper, I will show that there is a pl…
Reasons Internalism
This chapter provides an overview of some key arguments on behalf of internalism and externalism, respectively. It looks at how the debate over internalism interacts with the debate over moral rationalism. Moral rationalism, is the view that morality necessarily provides normative reasons. The chapter also provides the discussion of moral rationalism as a general frame to discuss some of the major versions of internalism. Much of the critical dis…
The Importance of Being Rational
The Importance of Being Rational systematically defends a novel reasons-based account of rationality. The book’s central thesis is that what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. The book defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons. It is shown that these views not only help to support the book’s main thesis, they also help to resolve…
What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing)
This chapter is about whether we ought to be rational—i.e., whether rationality is normative or deontically significant. Although this is a truism, skepticism about whether we ought to be rational is popular in the wake of very influential work by John Broome and Niko Kolodny. This chapter argues that Reasons Responsiveness vindicates the deontic significance of rationality. It is argued that it is independently plausible that what one deliberati…
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons (WKR) problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem relevant for reasons-based analyses. Some have argued that this problem is a general one for many theorists, and claim that this lightens the burden for reasons fundamentalists. We argue in this paper that the rev…
Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling
Humean theories of moral psychology explain the phenomena just by appeal to beliefs and desires. Once Humean moral psychology was orthodoxy, but then a revolt against it flourished for several—productive—decades. Now a Humean counter-revolt is under way. Here Neil Sinhababu joins the counter-revolt. I recommend it for those interested in the central notions of moral psychology—desire, intention, moral judgment, and will power. Although it has its…
Précis of The Importance of Being Rational
Replies to Schafer, Schroeder, and Staffel
The Vices of Perception
Enriched Perceptual Content and the Limits of Foundationalism
This paper is about the epistemology of perceptual experiences that have enriched high-level content. Enriched high-level content is content about features other than shape, color, and spatial relations that has a particular etiology. Its etiology runs through states of the agent that process other perceptual content and output sensory content about high-level features. My main contention is that the justification provided by such experiences (fo…
What Would Beauty Have to Be In Order to Save the World
Historically beauty has been seen to be one of the highest values. One thread in this tradition maintains that beauty has redemptive or salvific powers, that beauty has the power save, redeem, or transform, both individual lives and the world as a whole. This paper investigates what beauty would have to be in order to have certain salvific powers. The main negative conclusion is that a minimal condition is that the value of beauty be final rather…
To Know Beauty Exactly: The Aims of Eros and Aesthetic Judgment
Edith Landmann-Kalischer’s essays on aesthetics are a remarkable achievement that deserve widespread attention. Here I raise two related problems for her blend of Kantian hedonism with late nineteenth-century enthusiasm for the psychological sciences. First, I argue that she misconstrues the nature of beauty by maintaining that it is possible for it to be the object of science. Second, I argue that her hedonism prevents her from adequately accoun…
In search of lost principles: Generic Generalism in Aesthetics and Ethics
I defend a form of generalism in ethics and aesthetics. Generalism about a domain D is the view that there are principles that play an explanatory role in the metaphysics of D and can be used in reasoning when thinking about D. I argue that in both aesthetics and ethics, there are generic generalizations that are principles. I do this by (i) explaining the nature of a particularly important kind of generic, (ii) argue that generics of this kind p…
Of Soulmates and Old Spouses: How to be a Romantic Kantian about the Ethics of Love
This paper introduces and defends the foundations of a comprehensive Kantian view of the ethics of love, and shows how this relates to the ethics of respect. The view is Kantian insofar as it maintains that everyone shares a feature that makes them lovable. But it maintains that, due to the metaphysics of this feature, particular qualities of people provide reasons for love. This allows us to account for both the stability of lovability whilst al…
Philosophy (14 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (12 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 works) · Free Will and Agency (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Normative (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works)