Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality
Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5352152 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Errol Lord (Princeton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 243 |
| Pages | 392-399 |
| Publication date | 2011-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.688.x |
| OpenAlex | W1839116875 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide‐scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow‐scopers’) that it violates narrow‐scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter‐example to narrow‐scope views. But a narrow‐scoper should reject a crucial assumption which Brunero makes, namely, the claim that we always violate conditional narrow‐scope requirements when we do not comply with them. I show how Brunero's objection can be met by denying this claim, and I provide independent arguments in favour of denying it
Economics · Epistemology · Irrational number · Law and economics · Political science · Rationality · Scope (computer science) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,21 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2021 (10) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |