Partial Defeaters' and the Epistemology of Disagreement

Bibliographic Data

ID4351319
AuthorsMichael Thune (Purdue University West Lafayette, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume60
Issue239
Pages355-372
Publication date2010-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.611.x
OpenAlexW2090642475
LanguageEN
Citations received10

Can known disagreement with our epistemic peers undermine or defeat the justification our beliefs enjoy? Much of the current literature argues for one of two extreme positions on this topic, either that the justification of each person's belief is (fully) defeated by the awareness of disagreement, or that no belief is defeated by this awareness. I steer a middle course and defend a principle describing when a disagreement yields a partial defeater, which results in a loss of some, but not all, of the justification of a belief. I show that the ‘no defeater’ view is too strong. I also offer reasons for thinking that the ‘full defeater’ view is similarly mistaken

Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology

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