Conciliationism as Epistemic Concession in Religious Peer Disagreement

Bibliographic Data

ID22155332
AuthorsNesim Aslantatar (0000-0002-7817-8576, Indiana University Bloomington, corresponding author)
Year2025
Issue65
Pages1-15
Publication date2025-12-31
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
Venueİlahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2458-7508 • E-ISSN: 2602-3946
PublisherAtaturk Universitesi (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.29288/ilted.1657637
OpenAlexW4416558306
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited29

This paper examines religious disagreements between epistemic peers—individuals with equal cognitive capacities—focusing on the two dominant responses: conciliationism and steadfastness. While conciliationism advocates for a moderate attitude towards epistemic peers and revising one’s beliefs in case of disagreement, steadfastness argues that it is rational for an individual to maintain their current beliefs. I argue that conciliationism faces serious epistemic challenges, rendering it an unsustainable position. Building on a novel account of steadfastness, this study contends that retaining one’s belief in religious peer disagreement is rational if the following four conditions are met: (i) the believer’s evidence continues to support their belief within their interpretive and epistemic framework (independent justification); (ii) no genuine defeater undermines the belief either by rebutting it directly or undercutting the reliability of the evidence (absence of genuine defeat); (iii) the believer’s confidence remains above a rational threshold appropriate to the stakes of inquiry (confidence threshold);, and (iv) the believer holds a higher-order judgment affirming that their justification remains at least as strong as their peer’s (meta-belief endorsement). By integrating these conditions, the paper demonstrates that conciliationism (a) has a restrictive effects on religious and philosophical inquiry, (b) is internally inconsistent, (c) carries the risk of widespread epistemic uncertainty by opening the way to skepticism, and finally (d) carries the risk of weakening or even eliminating the function of evidence. Consequently, this study argues that this revised steadfastness framework offers a more defensible and epistemically responsible alternative to conciliationism, preserving the integrity of religious, inquiry while upholding the demands of epistemic rationality

Belief system · Cognition · Rational agent · Religious belief · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Karl Barth and Christian Theology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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