Thinking About Reasons
Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351545 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonas Olson (0000-0001-8323-9882) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 257 |
| Pages | 672-675 |
| Publication date | 2014-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqu038 |
| OpenAlex | W1978346401 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 1 |
During the last three decades, Jonathan Dancy's work has opened up new avenues in many areas of philosophy. Seven of the fourteen papers in this volume relate in one way or another to Dancy's influential work on particularism in ethics and holism about reasons, and with one exception, they are all largely sympathetic. The exception is Stephen Darwall's paper, which challenges particularists to account for the concept of moral obligation. According to Darwall, the grounds of moral obligations must be publicly contestable, and this requires that they be statable as moral principles. Our concept of moral obligation therefore presupposes moral principles. While the last step of this argument seems not indubitable, it is striking that particularists tend to focus on moral reasons. It would be interesting to know more about what a particularist account of moral obligation might look like. If Darwall is right that thought and judgement about moral obligation presuppose moral principles, and that moral obligation is crucial to moral thought and judgement, then one of Dancy's official statements of particularism, namely that ‘the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles’ (Dancy 2004: p. 7), is obviously under threat
Argument (complex analysis · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Holism · Judgement · Moral obligation · Moral psychology · Obligation · Political science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification · Law · Philosophy
Moral Obligation
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good
Contractualism and the Moral Point of View
(Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding
Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses
How “is” shapes “ought” for folk-biological concepts
Knowing in the “Executive Way”
Rossian Ethics
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2023 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |