Is Honesty Rational

Bibliographic Data

ID4351589
AuthorsGiorgio Sbardolini (0000-0003-0453-2445, University of Amsterdam, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume72
Issue4
Pages979-1001
Publication date2022-09-08
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqab071
OpenAlexW4206288101
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited35

According to the Maxim of Quality, rational agents tend to speak honestly. Due to the influence of Grice, a connection between linguistic rationality and honesty is often taken for granted. However, the connection is not obvious: structural rationality in language use does not require honesty, any more than it requires dishonesty. In particular, Quality does not follow from the Cooperative Principle and structural rationality. But then what is honest rational speech? I propose to move the discussion in the context of Stalnaker's theory of assertion. From this perspective, although there is no most rational way to behave, Quality follows from the structure of Stalnakerian conversations if interlocutors are sensitive to credibility. In this case, honesty is built on the expectation of reciprocity, and cooperativity is an outcome and not a precondition of rational communication. A benefit of my discussion is that the account of linguistic rationality falls under the more general view of interactive rationality familiar from theoretical economics

Assertion · Context (archaeology · Ecological rationality · Epistemology · Grice · Honesty · Linguistics · Pragmatics · Premise · Quality (philosophy · Rationality · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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