Saving Sensitivity

Bibliographic Data

ID4351758
AuthorsBrett Topey (0000-0002-4603-0569, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume72
Issue1
Pages177-196
Publication date2021-12-06
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqab015
OpenAlexW4253444658
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited39

Sensitivity has sometimes been thought to be a highly epistemologically significant property, serving as a proxy for a kind of responsiveness to the facts that ensure that the truth of our beliefs isn't just a lucky coincidence. But it's an imperfect proxy: there are various well-known cases in which sensitivity-based anti-luck conditions return the wrong verdicts. And as a result of these failures, contemporary theorists often dismiss such conditions out of hand. I show here, though, that a sensitivity-based understanding of epistemic luck can be developed that respects what was attractive about sensitivity-based approaches in the first place but that's immune to these failures

Epistemology · Imperfect · Linguistics · Luck · Property (philosophy) · Proxy (statistics) · Sensitivity (control systems) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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