Brett Topey
Biographic Data
| ID | 1218844 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brett Topey |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brett |
| FAMILY NAME | Topey |
| SIGNATURE | TOPEY B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Salzburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4603-0569 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Can we follow the omega rule
It’s generally thought that we finite beings can’t follow infinitary rules of inference like the omega rule. But this consensus has recently been challenged, most notably by Jared Warren, whose account of the determinacy of our arithmetical language depends on the claim that we do follow the omega rule. Warren argues for that claim by exhibiting a case in which it’s purportedly clear that we’re actually disposed to use that rule to infer a genera…
Best Laid Plans: Idealization and the Rationality–Accuracy Bridge
Greaves and Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy and so is a rational requirement, but their argument presupposes a particular picture of the bridge between rationality and accuracy: the best-plan-to-follow picture. And theorists such as Schoenfield and Steel argue that it is possible to motivate an alternative picture—the best-plan-to-make picture—that does not vindicate conditionalization. I show that these theorist…
Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism
The thesis that agents should calibrate their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence—i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty—is sometimes thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order to obey Bayesian norms, it’s claimed, agents must remain steadfast in the face of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim i…
Categoricity by convention
On a widespread naturalist view, the meanings of mathematical terms are determined, and can only be determined, by the way we use mathematical language—in particular, by the basic mathematical principles we’re disposed to accept. But it’s mysterious how this can be so, since, as is well known, minimally strong first-order theories are non-categorical and so are compatible with countless non-isomorphic interpretations. As for second-order theories…
Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: On modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge
A Benacerraf–Field challenge is an argument intended to show that common realist theories of a given domain are untenable: such theories make it impossible to explain how we’ve arrived at the truth in that domain, and insofar as a theory makes our reliability in a domain inexplicable, we must either reject that theory or give up the relevant beliefs. But there’s no consensus about what would count here as a satisfactory explanation of our reliabi…
Saving Sensitivity
Sensitivity has sometimes been thought to be a highly epistemologically significant property, serving as a proxy for a kind of responsiveness to the facts that ensure that the truth of our beliefs isn't just a lucky coincidence. But it's an imperfect proxy: there are various well-known cases in which sensitivity-based anti-luck conditions return the wrong verdicts. And as a result of these failures, contemporary theorists often dismiss such condi…
Quinean holism, analyticity, and diachronic rational norms
Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: On modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge
A Benacerraf–Field challenge is an argument intended to show that common realist theories of a given domain are untenable: such theories make it impossible to explain how we’ve arrived at the truth in that domain, and insofar as a theory makes our reliability in a domain inexplicable, we must either reject that theory or give up the relevant beliefs. But there’s no consensus about what would count here as a satisfactory explanation of our reliabi…
Quinean holism, analyticity, and diachronic rational norms
Categoricity by convention
On a widespread naturalist view, the meanings of mathematical terms are determined, and can only be determined, by the way we use mathematical language—in particular, by the basic mathematical principles we’re disposed to accept. But it’s mysterious how this can be so, since, as is well known, minimally strong first-order theories are non-categorical and so are compatible with countless non-isomorphic interpretations. As for second-order theories…
Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: On modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge
A Benacerraf–Field challenge is an argument intended to show that common realist theories of a given domain are untenable: such theories make it impossible to explain how we’ve arrived at the truth in that domain, and insofar as a theory makes our reliability in a domain inexplicable, we must either reject that theory or give up the relevant beliefs. But there’s no consensus about what would count here as a satisfactory explanation of our reliabi…
Saving Sensitivity
Sensitivity has sometimes been thought to be a highly epistemologically significant property, serving as a proxy for a kind of responsiveness to the facts that ensure that the truth of our beliefs isn't just a lucky coincidence. But it's an imperfect proxy: there are various well-known cases in which sensitivity-based anti-luck conditions return the wrong verdicts. And as a result of these failures, contemporary theorists often dismiss such condi…
Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism
The thesis that agents should calibrate their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence—i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty—is sometimes thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order to obey Bayesian norms, it’s claimed, agents must remain steadfast in the face of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim i…
Can we follow the omega rule
It’s generally thought that we finite beings can’t follow infinitary rules of inference like the omega rule. But this consensus has recently been challenged, most notably by Jared Warren, whose account of the determinacy of our arithmetical language depends on the claim that we do follow the omega rule. Warren argues for that claim by exhibiting a case in which it’s purportedly clear that we’re actually disposed to use that rule to infer a genera…
Best Laid Plans: Idealization and the Rationality–Accuracy Bridge
Greaves and Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy and so is a rational requirement, but their argument presupposes a particular picture of the bridge between rationality and accuracy: the best-plan-to-follow picture. And theorists such as Schoenfield and Steel argue that it is possible to motivate an alternative picture—the best-plan-to-make picture—that does not vindicate conditionalization. I show that these theorist…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)