Best Laid Plans
Idealization and the Rationality–Accuracy Bridge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399230 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brett Topey (0000-0002-4603-0569, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 477-494 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/718275 |
| OpenAlex | W3215289164 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 10 |
Greaves and Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy and so is a rational requirement, but their argument presupposes a particular picture of the bridge between rationality and accuracy: the best-plan-to-follow picture. And theorists such as Schoenfield and Steel argue that it is possible to motivate an alternative picture—the best-plan-to-make picture—that does not vindicate conditionalization. I show that these theorists are mistaken: it turns out that if an update procedure maximizes expected accuracy on the best-plan-to-follow picture, it is guaranteed to maximize expected accuracy on the best-plan-to-make picture as well, in which case moving from the former to the latter cannot help us avoid the conclusion that conditionalization is a rational requirement. If there is a problem with Greaves and Wallace’s argument, it must lie elsewhere
Bridge (graph theory · Epistemology · Idealization · Philosophy of science · Rationality · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |