Causal Refutations of Idealism
Causal Refutations of Idealism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351955 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Chignell (Cornell University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 240 |
| Pages | 487-507 |
| Publication date | 2009-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.636.x |
| OpenAlex | W1905409149 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
In the ‘Refutation of Idealism’ chapter of the first Critique, Kant argues that the conditions required for having certain kinds of mental episodes are sufficient to guarantee that there are ‘objects in space’ outside us. A perennially influential way of reading this compressed argument is as a kind of causal inference: in order for us to make justified judgements about the order of our inner states, those states must be caused by the successive states of objects in space outside us. Here I consider the best recent versions of this reading, and argue that each suffers from apparently fatal flaws
Argument (complex analysis · Economics · Epistemology · Idealism · Inference · Linguistics · Order (exchange · Reading (process · Space (punctuation) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
Consciousness as Inner Sensation
Disentangling Cartesian Global Skepticism from Cartesian Problematic External-World Idealism in Kant’s Refutation
Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism
Kant's Refutation of Idealism
What Is This Thing Called a Transcendental Argument
What Descartes Doubted, Berkeley Denied, and Kant Endorsed
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,43 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |