What Descartes Doubted, Berkeley Denied, and Kant Endorsed

Bibliographic Data

ID9689866
AuthorsKenneth L Pearce (0000-0001-9419-1183, Trinity College Dublin, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume58
Issue1
Pages31-63
Publication date2019-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217317000981
OpenAlexW2779026097
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited39

According to Kant, there is some doctrine, which he sometimes calls ‘empirical realism,’ such that it was doubted by Descartes, denied by Berkeley, and endorsed by Kant himself. The primary aim of this paper will be to reconstruct Kant’s own narrative of the historical relationship between Descartes, Berkeley, and himself, in order to identify the doctrine Kant calls ‘empirical realism.’ I argue that the empirical realism that Descartes doubted, Berkeley denied, and Kant endorsed is the doctrine that the concept of extended substance has legitimate application

Doctrine · Epistemology · Narrative · Order (exchange) · Realism · Reflexive pronoun · Theology · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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