The Great and the Small
The Impact of Collective Action on the Evolution of Board Interlocks after the Panic of 1907
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4522586 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lori Qingyuan Yue (0000-0002-1985-2209, University of Southern California, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 81 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 374-395 |
| Publication date | 2016-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Sociological Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-1224 • E-ISSN: 1939-8271 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0003122416631989 |
| OpenAlex | W2310084241 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 50 |
Conventional research in organizational theory highlights the role of board interlocks in facilitating business collective action. In this article, I propose that business collective action affects the evolutionary path of interlock networks. In particular, large market players' response after a collective action to the classic problem of the "exploitation" of the great by the small provides a mechanism for interlocks to evolve. Through studying the two types of collective action that banks organized during the Panic of 1907, I find that the experience of issuing currency substitutes, a course of collective action that needed to mobilize community support, made bankers more aware of their responsibility for community welfare. In the post-crisis period, bankers were thus more supportive of the market stabilization strategy of assisting small banks. In contrast, the experience of organizing mutual lending, a course of collective action that highlighted the power of businesses independent of the communities in which they were located, led bankers to focus more on their sectional interest and favor the market stabilization strategy of eliminating small banks. These different attitudes toward small banks affected the evolution of the interlock networks between large and small banks
Action (physics · Business · Collective action · Economics · Industrial organization · Interlock · Market economy · Market power · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Corporate Finance and Governance · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism · Law · Management and Organizational Studies
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Fitting Fully Observed Recursive Mixed-process Models with cmp
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
The Logic of Collective Action
The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite
The Pressure of the Past
The Paradox of American Democracy
Capitalist Collective Action
Capitalist Collective Action
The External Control of Organizations. A Resource Dependence Perspective
Contemporary social problems
Corporate Mobilization and Political Power
Making Democracy Work
The Ties That Bind
A Dynamic Process Model of Private Politics
The Political Partisanship of American Business
Class Segments
Political Holes in the Economy
Small Business, Status Politics, and the Social Base of New Christian Right Activism
What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates
Community Constraints on the Efficacy of Elite Mobilization
Echoes of the Past
Corporate Unity in American Trade Policy
Trouble in Store
Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites
Lost in Space
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,56 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2023 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |