Davidson on First-Person Authority

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4774992
AutoresP M S Hacker (St. John's College, autor correspondente)
Ano1997
Volume47
Fascículo188
Páginas285-304
Data de publicação1997-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00060
OpenAlexW2153195061
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas3

Davidson’s explanation of first‐person authority in utterance of sentences of the form ‘I V that p’ derives first‐person authority from the requirements of interpretation of speech. His account is committed to the view that utterance sentences are truth‐bearers, that believing that p is a matter of holding true an utterance sentence, and that a speaker’s knowledge of what he means gives him knowledge of what belief he expresses by his utterance. These claims are here faulted. His explanation of first‐person authority by reference to the requirements of interpretability is committed to the view that all understanding involves interpretation. This is argued to be a misconception of understanding and of speaker’s meaning. Davidson’s account involves acceptance of the cognitive assumption that normally when a person Vs that p, he knows that he does. This assumption is challenged. Throughout, Davidson’s conception is compared and contrasted with Wittgenstein’s

Epistemology · First person · Interpretability · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Sentence · Utterance · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications