Law and Moral Justification
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4808869 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrea Faggion (0000-0003-4260-1771, Universidade Estadual de Londrina, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 145 |
| Pages | 55-72 |
| Publication date | 2020-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Kriterion Revista de Filosofia (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0100-512X • E-ISSN: 1981-5336 |
| Publisher | FapUNIFESP (SciELO) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1590/0100-512x2020n14503af |
| OpenAlex | W3125210810 |
| SciELO | S0100-512X2020000100055 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 5 |
Many prominent legal philosophers believe that law makes some type of moral claim in virtue of its nature. Although the law is not an intelligent agent, the attribution of a claim to law does not need to be as mysterious as some theorists believe. It means that law-making and law- applying acts are intelligible only in the light of a certain presupposition, even if a lawmaker or a law-applier subjectively disbelieves the content of that presupposition. In this paper, I aim to clarify what type of moral claim would be suitable for law if law were to make a claim to be morally justified. I then argue that legal practice is perfectly intelligible without moral presuppositions - that is, that the law does not necessarily make moral claims
Attribution · Epistemology · Philosophy of law · Political science · Presupposition · Public law · Sociology · Virtue · Free Will and Agency · Law · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Legal principles and applications · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2023 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |