Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership

Datos Bibliográficos

ID5044366
AutoresColin Jennings (0000-0002-5554-3825, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, colin.jennings @strath.ac.uk), Hein Roelfsema (0000-0003-1146-8541, Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University, h.j.roelfesema@econ. uu.nl)
Año2008
Volumen45
Número4
Páginas557-573
Fecha de publicación2008-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022343308091361
OpenAlexW1981428761
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas28

This article analyzes negative externalities that policymakers in one region or group may impose upon the citizens of neighboring regions or groups. These externalities may be material, but they may also be psychological (in the form of envy). The latter form of externality may arise from the production of `conspicuous' public goods. As a result, decentralized provision of conspicuous public goods may be too high. Potentially, a centralized legislature may internalize negative externalities. However, in a model with strategic delegation, we argue that the median voter in each jurisdiction may anticipate a reduction in local public goods supply and delegate to a policymaker who cares more for public goods than she does herself. This last effect mitigates the expected benefits of policy centralization. The authors' theory is then applied to the setting of civil conflict, where they discuss electoral outcomes in Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia before and after significant institutional changes that affected the degree of centralization. These case studies provide support for the authors' theoretical predictions

Business · Delegate · Delegation · Economics · Externality · Federalism · Jurisdiction · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public good · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration