Knowledge and Practical Reason
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5081189 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jessica Brown (0000-0002-1149-4814, St. Andrews University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1135-1152 |
| Publication date | 2008-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00176.x |
| OpenAlex | W2091429086 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 26 |
| References cited | 14 |
It has become recently popular to suggest that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning and that this provides an important constraint on the correct account of knowledge, one which favours subject-sensitive invariantism over contextualism and classic invariantism. I argue that there are putative counterexamples to both directions of the knowledge norm. Even if the knowledge norm can be defended against these counterexamples, I argue that it is a delicate issue whether it is true, one which relies on fine distinctions among a variety of relevant notions of propriety which our intuitions may reflect. These notions variously apply to the agent herself, her character traits, her beliefs, her reasoning and any resultant action. Given the delicacy of these issues, I argue that the knowledge norm is not a fixed point from which to defend substantive and controversial views in epistemology. Rather, these views need to be defended on other grounds
Contextualism · Counterexample · Epistemology · Linguistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Norms of Reasoning
Inquiry for the mistaken and confused
Reasons First
The Grounds of Political Legitimacy
The Moral Duty Against Dogmatism
Knowledge, reasoning, and deliberation
Moorean Promises
Probing the mind of God
Common Sense and Evidence
Practical Certainty
Degrees of Assertability
The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning
Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision
Knowledge and decision
Assertion, action, and context
Fallibilism and the value of knowledge
Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy
Rational action without knowledge (and vice versa)
The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity
In defence of virtue epistemology
Implicature and non-local pragmatic encroachment
Impurism, pragmatic encroachment, and the Argument from Principles
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
Certainty in Action
The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions
Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Knowledge and Action
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge
On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
Knowledge and Conversation
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions
How Knowledge Works
| Unique citing works | 26 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,73 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2025 (15) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 24 |