How Knowledge Works
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351797 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Hyman (0000-0001-6640-4719, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 197 |
| Pages | 433-451 |
| Publication date | 1999-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00152 |
| OpenAlex | W2126510731 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 76 |
| References cited | 7 |
The doctrine that knowledge is a species of belief has encouraged philosophers to confuse the question of what knowledge is and the question of how it can be acquired. But we can form a conception of knowledge by asking how knowledge gets expressed in our mental lives and in our conduct, instead of asking where it comes from. Accordingly, knowledge can be defined as the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts. I examine the nature of reasons, and the relationship between reasons, facts and beliefs; I consider the question of whether animals without language are capable of knowledge; and I briefly criticize Wittgenstein’s doctrine that I cannot be said to know that I am in pain
Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge
The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Knowledge and its Limits
Building an equitable pipeline of educators by assessing equity and customizing innovative professional development
Doxastic Revision in Non-Human Animals
From the agent’s point of view
Reasons for telling
(Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding
Attitudes, conditional and general
Partial Reliance
Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle
Do affective desires provide reasons for action
The matter of motivating reasons
Epistemology without guidance
Explanation and the A-theory
What we know when we act
What is rational belief
In touch with the facts
Epistemic reasons as propositional attitudes
Reasons and ‘because’
Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories
Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth
Christian Wolff über motivierende Gründe und handlungsrelevante Irrtümer
Consequentialism and Moral Worth
Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance and the Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’
O que é agência epistêmica, afinal
Singularities
Lingwistyczna teoria mowy. Preliminaria
Common Sense and Evidence
The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis
Social Knowing
Deception and Evidence 1
The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of Its History
Realism, Metasemantics, and Risk
Commentary on Ted Ruffman’s “Belief or not belief
Evolution of human cooperation in Homo heidelbergensis
An explanationist account of genealogical defeat
Things That Make Things Reasonable
Practical Certainty
Knowing in the “Executive Way”
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality
Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons
Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief
Assertion and Practical Reasoning
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons
Hyman on Knowledge and Ability
Hyman, Ryle, and the Unity of Knowledge
Knowing how and being able
Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality
The puzzle of plausible deniability
Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory
Actions, reasons, and becauses
The disvalue of knowledge
Evidence and armchair access
Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition
Strong knowledge, weak belief
Are abilities dispositions
On the generality argument for the knowledge norm
Emotions, evidence, and safety
McDowell’s infallibilism and the nature of knowledge
Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge
Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat
Dilemmic Epistemology
Controlling core knowledge
Action, Knowledge, and Will
Explaining Action
Epistemology Formalized
Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints
The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge
Two Arguments for Evidentialism
Knowledge and Practical Reason
Fiction and Epistemic Value
The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason
Knowledge Out of Control
Epistemic Reasons II
| Unique citing works | 76 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,17 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2026 (25) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 75 |