The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9689260 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Julien Dutant (0000-0002-2939-5670, University of Geneva, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 141-162 |
| Publication date | 2012-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217312000285 |
| OpenAlex | W2136365394 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 15 |
Meno’s Thesis —the idea that knowing something is better than merely having a true belief about it—is incompatible with the joint claims that (a) believing the truth is the sole source of the value of knowledge and (b) true belief and knowledge are equally successful in believing the truth. Recent answers to that so-called “swamping” problem reject either (a) or (b). This paper rejects Meno’s Thesis instead, as relying on a confusion between expected value and value proper. The proposed solution relies on an externalist view of rationality, which is presented
Confusion · Epistemology · Externalism · Linguistics · Psychoanalysis · Rationality · Truth value · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Achieving Knowledge
Providence and the Problem of Evil
The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding
Knowledge and its Limits
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief
Knowledge and Action
Generics
Reliability and the Value of Knowledge
Normative Requirements
Epistemology and cognition
How Knowledge Works
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2018 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |