The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of Its History

Bibliographic Data

ID5789136
AuthorsMaria Rosa Antognazza (0000-0002-5214-479X, King's College London, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume23
Issue1
Pages161-184
Publication date2014-11-05
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2014.974020
OpenAlexW2164250871
LanguageEN
Citations received19
References cited44

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history.Keywords: history of philosophyepistemologymetaphysicshistoriography Notes1 A version of this paper was presented in November 2013 at King's College London as my Inaugural Lecture. I would like to thank Michael Ayers for allowing me to draw on our work-in-progress for the first part of this article. Thanks are also due to Michael Beaney and three anonymous referees for a number of helpful suggestions, and to Eleanor Knox for advice on the philosophy of physics. My deepest debt is to Howard Hotson for many insightful conversations on the issues discussed in this article.2In this paper, Skinner famously advances the following rule of interpretation and historical reconstruction (28): 'no agent can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never have been brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done'.3Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner, Philosophy in History, 11-14. See especially the following essays included in the volume: Taylor, 'Philosophy and Its History'; MacIntyre, 'The Relationship of Philosophy to Its Past'; Rorty, 'The Historiography of Philosophy'. Amongst key essays in the historiography of philosophy published in recent years, see Garber, 'Au-delà des arguments des philosophes'; Hunter, 'The History of Philosophy'; Glock, 'Analytic Philosophy and History'.4Sorell and Rogers, Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy. See especially the following essays included in the volume: Cottingham, 'Why Should Analytic Philosophers Do History of Philosophy?'; Sorell, 'On Saying No'; Wilson, 'Is the History of Philosophy Good for Philosophy?'; Hatfield, 'The History of Philosophy as Philosophy'; Garber, 'What's Philosophical About the History of Philosophy?'.5As noted by Beaney in his illuminating chapter on 'The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy', 55, work on the history of analytical philosophy has multiplied over the past decade. This development includes the establishment in 2011 of a Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, and the creation of a monograph series in the history of analytical philosophy (Palgrave Macmillan). On the 'historical turn' in analytical philosophy see Beaney, 'The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy', 52-6 and Reck, The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy.6This is a first-pass approximation which is explored in a much more nuanced way in the course of the volume.7Russell, Critical Exposition, Preface to the First Edition, xi-xii. Another version of this dichotomy is captured by Rorty through the distinction between 'historical' and 'rational' reconstruction (Rorty, 'The Historiography of Philosophy').8Russell, Critical Exposition, Preface to the First Edition, xii: in such inquiries the philosopher is no longer explained psychologically: he is examined as the advocate of what he holds to be a body of philosophical truth. By what process of development he came to this opinion, though in itself an important and interesting question, is logically irrelevant to the inquiry how far the opinion itself is correct.9The need of a synthesis between the 'historical' and 'philosophical' approaches for a proper understanding of the 'tensions' which drive philosophical thinking was already advocated by Ernst Cassirer in his review of Russell's book on Leibniz (see Cassirer, Leibniz' System, 532-41). Attention to the importance of Russell's views and Cassirer's reply for the historiography of philosophy is drawn by Beaney in 'The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy', 38-42. See also, Hunter, 'Russell Making History'. Beaney 'Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy: the Development of the Idea of Rational Reconstruction' proposes a resolution of the tension between 'rational' and 'historical' reconstructions through what he calls 'dialectical reconstruction'.10The golden rule that the views of past philosophers should be reconstructed 'on their own terms' is well established amongst historians of philosophy who stress the importance of the context in which views developed for a proper understanding of those very views. See, for instance, Hatfield, 'The History of Philosophy as Philosophy', 97. For a discussion of what it may mean to account for the views of past philosophers on their own terms, see, for instance, Lærke, 'The Anthropological Analogy', esp. 18-29.11I agree here with Russell and others that there are indeed problems of enduring philosophical relevance, against the view that history would cure one of this very idea. An adequate defence of this thesis is beyond the scope of this paper but to give a couple of examples, I would count amongst such problems the inquiry into the nature of knowledge, or into the nature of what is ultimately real. This is different from missing the 'sense of historical contingency' inculcated by the history of philosophy (Philosophy and Its History, 14) or from taking as 'traditional or even "timeless" truths' what may well be 'the merest contingencies of our peculiar history and social structure' (Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding', 52). As I try to show below with my second example, studying the history of philosophy provides a very good antidote precisely against the temptation of collapsing currently prevailing views if not into a 'timeless truth' at least into the best explanation.12A version of this point can be found in Della Rocca, 'The Taming of Philosophy'.13Views briefly presented here are explored and defended in much greater detail in a paper which I am jointly writing with Michael Ayers on the so-called traditional analysis of knowledge.14Klein, 'Epistemology', Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Paul K. Moser in his 'Introduction' to The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, 4, maintains that an influential traditional view, inspired by Plato and Kant among others, is that propositional knowledge has three individually necessary and jointly sufficient components: justification, truth, and belief. On this view, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This tripartite definition has come to be called 'the standard analysis'.The 'General Introduction' to a comprehensive anthology of texts on Human Knowledge (eds. Paul K. Moser and Arnold van der Nat, 3rd ed. 2003, 1) states that 'the traditional view of human propositional knowledge, originating in Plato's Meno and Theaetetus, acknowledges three essential, or required, components of such knowledge. These components are captured by the view that knowledge is, inherently, justified true belief'. See also Shope, 'Conditions and Analyses of Knowing', 29.15Gettier, 'Is justified true belief knowledge?'16Pollock, Contemporaries Theories of Knowledge, 180. It should be noted that Russell had already found a counterexample in 1912, well before Gettier's paper (Problems of Philosophy, ch.13; see also Human Knowledge, 170-1). I am grateful to Michael Beaney for these references.17See Shope, The Analysis of Knowing and Shope, 'Conditions and Analyses of Knowing' for a sophisticated discussion of almost countless attempts.18See, for instance, Quine, 'Epistemology Naturalized'; Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature; Hyman 'How Knowledge Works'; Kornblith, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature. In the early twentieth century, the so-called 'Oxford realists' (notably J. Cook Wilson and H. A. Prichard) never embraced a conception of knowledge as justified true belief. Instead, they saw knowledge and belief as different in kind, with knowledge prior. See Marion, 'Oxford Realism' and Travis - Kalderon, 'Oxford Realism'.19Gerson, Ancient Epistemology, 2-3; see also Gerson, 'Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis'. For a different view see Fine, 'Knowledge and Belief in Plato's Republic 5-7'; Fine, 'Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno'; Fine, The Possibility of Inquiry.20See, for instance, Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism.21'Knowledge' and 'opinion' are in fact largely treated in Republic 477a-478d as powers or faculties.22 Posterior Analytics B19 (99b15-100b17).23See Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, I 236-66; II 238-63.24Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, 'Rule Three' (AT X, 366/CSM I, 13). See also CSM I, 13, footnote 1.25Gettier himself tentatively claims that the 'traditional' analysis of knowledge starts with Plato (Gettier, 'Is justified true belief knowledge?': 'Plato seems to be suggesting such definition at Theaetetus 201, and perhaps accepting one at Meno 98'). Interestingly, however, the two definitions of knowledge explicitly quoted as advancing the view that knowledge is justified true belief (Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge and Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study) do not pre-date Gettier's article more than a few years.26Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 2, art. 1: If 'to think' is taken broadly ... then 'to think with assent' does not express completely what it is 'to believe' since, in this way, also the one considering the things he knows or understands thinks with assent [hoc quod dicitur cum assensione cogitare non dicit totam rationem eius quod est credere, nam per hunc modum etiam qui considerat ea quae scit vel intelligit cum assensione cogitat].All translations of Aquinas' Summa Theologiae are my own, based on the Textum Leoninum (Rome 1886-1887) now available online in Corpus Thomisticum. When Aquinas uses key terms such as intellectus, ratio, visio, cognitio, scientia, notitia, and credere I give also the original Latin due to the notorious ambiguity of the English translation of some of these terms.27 Summa Theologiae IIa IIae, q. 2, art. 1: in the act of believing there is firm acceptance of one side; in this respect the one who believes is similar to the one who knows and the one who understands [actus iste qui est credere habet firmam adhaesionem ad unam partem, in quo convenit credens cum sciente et intelligente], and yet his cognition is not perfect by means of clear sight [eius cognitio non est perfecta per manifestam visionem], in which respect he is similar to the one who doubts, suspects, and opines. And this is proper of the believer as one who thinks with assent [ut cum assensu cogitet], and in this the act of believing is distinguished from all the acts of the intellect which are about the true and the false.See also Summa Theologiae IIa IIae, q. 1, art. 5.28As Aquinas explains it (Summa Theologiae IIa IIae, q. 1, art. 5): all knowledge [scientia] is acquired through some self-evident, and therefore 'seen', principles [principia per se nota, et per consequens visa]. And for that reason it is necessary that whatsoever is known is, in some way, seen [quaecumque sunt scita aliquo modo esse visa]. Now, as stated above, it is not possible that the same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is indeed impossible that the same things be known and believed [scitum et creditum] by the same person. Nevertheless it may happen that what is seen or known [visum vel scitum] by one, is believed by another.29In his monumental study on The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics (54), Cˇapek argues that this is the concept of matter commonly held until the beginning of the twentieth century. The first part of his book is devoted to expounding the 'classical picture of the physical world' up until the advent of atomic physics, relativity theory, and quantum theory.30By the mid-twentieth century it was already clear that the move away of physics from entities similar to the objects of our sense experience towards abstract mathematical constructs called for a radically different view of nature. Cf. Cˇapek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics, esp. part II, chapters XVIII-XIX. A very interesting way to address the discrepancy between scientific theory and our pre-theoretical or experiential knowledge of the world has been proposed by Ayers, 'Reflections on the Notion of Substance', 110-28. According to this proposal, insights embodied in traditional realist doctrines of substance point to the source of primitive structural features of our thinking and language that are largely neglected or down-played in current theory, and to which considerations drawn from the philosophy of physics are simply irrelevant.31This is the conclusion reached already in 1963 by Ernan McMullin at the end of his introduction to the massive volume on The Concept of Matter collecting contributions on Ancient, Medieval, and Modern conceptions of matter in philosophy and science. See 38-41 (here 41).32Westerhoff, 'Is Matter Real?', 37-46. Westerhoff concludes that 'the moral to draw' from a reductionist scenario driven by recent theories in subatomic physics is that 'either what is fundamental is not material, or that nothing at all is fundamental' (46).33I argue for this reading of Leibniz's conception of primary matter in more detail in Antognazza, 'Primary Matter'.34'Extraits de Twisse', c. 1695 (in Leibniz, Textes inédits, 355-6): Being posited or actuality, and restriction or the privative are in beings like metaphysical form and metaphysical matter [Positio vel actus, et restrictio vel privativo se habent in entibus ut forma metaphysica et materia metaphysica]. And thus the matter of things is nothing [est nihilum], i.e. limitation; [their] form is perfection.35This is analogous to what Ockham does with quantity forms. See Adams, Ockham, vol. 2, 694.36See Leibniz to De Volder, around January 1705 (in Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften, vol. II, 275; translated by Lodge in The Leibniz-De Volder Correspondence, 319): I do not really do away with body, but reduce it to what it is. For I show that a corporeal mass that is believed to have something besides simple substances is not a substance but a phenomenon resulting from simple substances, which alone have unity and absolute reality.37Cf. the so-called 'Merton thesis', advanced in 1938 by sociologist of science Robert K. Merton in Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England. This thesis was debated in a huge body of journal articles in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in Charles Webster's mammoth monograph of 1976, The Great Instauration.38It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a proper investigation of the notion of historical truth. On this issue see for instance Lærke, 'The Anthropological Analogy' and Smith, 'The History of Philosophy as Past and as Process'.39This is not an endorsement of a Russell-like narrative 'without regard to dates or influences' in its investigation of 'the great philosophers of the past' (Russell, Critical Exposition, Preface to the First Edition, xii). There is no isolated emergence and existence of 'great minds' transforming on their own the philosophical landscape. Paradigm-shifting is possible only against the backdrop of received and/or competing paradigms. As I tried to show with my third example, discovering why and how the shifting took place requires the interrogation of complex synchronic and diachronic conversations steeped in social, political, cultural, and religious contexts and commitments. On the other hand, I do not see why this recognition should lead to denying the existence of extraordinary minds capable of reshaping the intellectual inheritance in striking ways

History of philosophy · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, History, and Historiography

Tools

Open DOISci-HubOpen Access