Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5338546 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elisabeth Pacherie (0000-0003-2337-581X, Institut Jean Nicod, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 67-73 |
| Publication date | 2011-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1864-9335 • E-ISSN: 2151-2590 |
| Publisher | Hogrefe Verlag (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1027/1864-9335/a000044 |
| OpenAlex | W2154611954 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 35 |
| References cited | 12 |
In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relationships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements, thus allowing them to come under intentional control. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy these nonconceptual representations enjoy, and the specific temporal constraints stemming from their role in motor control, set limits on intentional control over action execution
Action (physics · Autonomy · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Control (management · Epistemology · Set (abstract data type · Action Observation and Synchronization · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Artificial Intelligence · Philosophy · Social Psychology
Motor intentionality
Mental Imagery
Pragmatic Mental Imagery
Vicarious Perception
Pragmatic Representations
Perception
Action
Seeing Goal-Directedness
The Standard Story of Action and the Problem of Agential Guidance
Imagery in action. G. H. Mead’s contribution to sensorimotor enactivism
Attending, acting, and feeling together
How Knowing-That and Knowing-How Interface in Action
Motoric representational format
The direction of fit of affective forecasting
A Control Theory of Action
Through the forest of motor representations
A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception
On knowledge in action
The motivational role of affect in an ecological model
Conscious Access in Skilled Action
Using the body without thinking about it
Cognitive control, intentions, and problem solving in skill learning
Implicit biases in visually guided action
Anti-intellectualist motor knowledge
Between vision and action
Motor representation in acting together
Chimps as secret agents
Embodied skillful performance
Practical concepts and productive reasoning
Teleosemantics without Etiology
The selective advantage of representing correctly
Between Perception and Action
Limits of Intentionality
Breadth and Depth
Limits of the Conscious Control of Action
| Unique citing works | 35 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,33 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 35 |