Changing a 'culture' of corruption
Evidence from an economic experiment in Italy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5722211 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nan Zhang (0000-0002-8032-275X, European University Institute), Zhang Nan (0000-0003-3020-8438, European University Institute, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 387-413 |
| Publication date | 2015-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463115605475 |
| OpenAlex | W2314255928 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 48 |
Empirical evidence demonstrates that bribery, extortion and graft are often the outgrowths of a deeper 'culture of corruption' which has proved disconcertingly resilient in the face of public sector reforms. This article investigates whether changing collective beliefs about how 'most people in society' will behave can reform prevailing cultural practices. Employing an economic experiment involving northern and southern Italian university students, this study shows that (costly) honest behavior can be sustained by conditional beliefs about the honesty of others. I also hypothesize that, given southern Italians' reputation for corruption, informing participants that they are interacting with southerners should increase the level of bribery in the experiment. However, surprisingly, I find the opposite effect: when exposed to information about the identity of their fellow participants, southern Italians are not only less corrupt, but they are also more likely to believe that their counterparts are less corrupt. I discuss several explanations which may account for these unexpected findings. Overall, the paper provides theoretical foundations and experimental support for how new cultural practices might emerge
Corrupt practices · Economics · Empirical evidence · Extortion · Honesty · Language change · Nepotism · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Reputation · Social science · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
Micromotives and macrobehavior
Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences
Africa
The Grammar of Society
The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development
How corruption may corrupt
The Dishonesty of Honest People
Corruption and culture
Culture rules
Forecasting risk attitudes
Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in attitudes toward financial risk
Z-Tree
Culture matters
Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa
Nations, States, and Violence
Controlling Corruption
Corruption and Government
Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated With Italian Data
Wealth, Culture, and Corruption
The Triumph of Ethnic Progressivism
Corruption and corruptibility
Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform
Regional Governance Matters
Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement
Reform and Reformers in the Progressive Era
Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society
Comparing Corruption in the Laboratory and in the Field in Burkina Faso and in Canada
Mapping the Regional Divide in Europe
Identity in formation
Making Democracy Work
Moral Basis of a Backward Society
Competitive Corruption
Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem
A focus theory of normative conduct
Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem
Do the right thing
Social Norms and Social Roles
Ending Footbinding and Infibulation
A moral economy of corruption in Africa
Do Institutions or Culture Determine the Level of Social Trust? The Natural Experiment of Migration from Non-western to Western Countries
Rationality, ethnicity and military enlistment
Bribery in Preindustrial Societies
| Citations per year | 1.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |