Ending institutions
Rule enforcement in self-governance systems
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5722225 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Antonio C Pedro (De La Salle University, Philippines, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 80-107 |
| Publication date | 2018-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463117734176 |
| OpenAlex | W2778127310 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 28 |
How are rules enforced in the absence of an organization with coercive powers? I examine the role of informal institutions in supporting self-enforcement of rules through ethnographic research on a popular form of community-based gambling in the Philippines. In ending, a reputation-based mechanism shapes exchange relations between bettors and bet-takers, and among members of a local community. Social norms about sharing one's winnings ( balato) provide community members with an interest in the outcome of these exchange relations, thereby strengthening the ability of bettors to acquire information about the reputation of various bet-takers. In consequence, bet-takers exert efforts to safeguard their reputation, and comply with informal rules about the immediate and complete delivery of winnings. The findings suggest that when communities are small enough so that members are able to observe each other, but not too small so that no individual possesses all the relevant information, then social norms that generate effective transmission of reputational information provide sufficient institutional support for self-governance
Business · Corporate governance · Enforcement · Epistemology · Information exchange · Law and economics · Political science · Public relations · Reputation · Self-governance · Sociology · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Gambling Behavior and Treatments · Law · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
Governing the Commons
Order without Law
Institutions and Social Conflict
The Rational Peasant
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade
The Evolution of Conventions
Principles of Group Solidarity
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Institutions and Social Order
Elections as Popular Culture in Asia
Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy
Community, Anarchy and Liberty
Social and Unsocial Capital
The Enforcement of Norms
The Possibility of Cooperation
Constitutions and Commitment
Making Democracy Work
Coping With Tragedies of the Commons
Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem
Norm enforcement among the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen
A Grammar of Institutions
The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation
Foundations of Social Theory
Collective Benefits, Exchange Interests, and Norm Enforcement
The Moral Economy of the Peasant
Trust, Institutions, and Institutional Change
Human Motivation and Social Cooperation
Collective Sanctions and the Creation of Prisoner's Dilemma Norms
| Highly cited | No |
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