Explaining contributions to public goods
Formalizing the social exchange heuristic
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5722331 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jacob Dijkstra (University of Groningen/ICS, The Netherlands, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 324-342 |
| Publication date | 2012-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463111434702 |
| OpenAlex | W2317937821 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 24 |
The public good game is a popular model of cooperation problems. Rational egoism predicts that in finitely repeated public good games no contributions are made. At least 4 observations are inconsistent with this prediction: contributions (i) are frequently positive, (ii) increase in the marginal rate of return of the public good, (iii) increase in the expected contributions of others, and (iv) decrease as the public good game is repeated. I build a rational choice model that explains these observations, extending and formalizing the social exchange heuristic. The model does not assume a specific utility function. I assume that total utility is a strictly increasing function of monetary and social utility, and then show that concave utility functions and a positive cross-partial derivate of total utility to monetary and social utility are sufficient conditions to arrive at a model compatible with the 4 observations. Directions for future (experimental) research are discussed
Economics · Heuristic · Marginal utility · Mathematical economics · Mathematical optimization · Microeconomics · Public good · Social exchange theory · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Social exchange and reciprocity
A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
Public Goods
Testing theories of fairness—Intentions matter
Economists free ride, does anyone else?
Why free ride?
Erc
Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Social Values, Subjective Transformations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Undermining trust and cooperation
The Social Exchange Heuristic
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Bowling Alone
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Foundations of Social Theory
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,23 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2016 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |