Patrimony and Collective Capacity

An Analytical Outline

Bibliographic Data

ID5742166
AuthorsIvan Ermakoff (corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume636
Issue1
Pages182-203
Publication date2011-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-7162 • E-ISSN: 1552-3349
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0002716211401170
OpenAlexW2116906938
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited42

This article investigates the ways in which the appropriation of offices and positions for personal use ("patrimony") shapes incentive structures and collective capacity. Within the context of an agency relation, patrimonial power characterizes a mode of political dominance and resource management excluding accountability. This micro-analytical definition identifies three sources of variation: (1) the degree of codification, (2) the extent to which allegiance is personal (versus office-based), and (3) the extent to which dependence is asymmetrical. Patrimonial power enhances collective capacity through the creation of nodes of agency. It undermines this capacity by begetting arbitrary power and instability, by undercutting incentives for productive innovations, and by fostering the downward fragmentation of spheres of influence. Actors get out of this structural logic through two conjoint processes: (1) groups vying for office regulate the terms of their competition (intergroup dynamics), and (2) principals develop an incentive to make themselves accountable to fend off their agents' possible exit (intragroup dynamics

Accountability · Agency (philosophy) · Appropriation · Business · Collective action · Context (archaeology) · Dominance (genetics) · Economics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Southeast Asian Sociopolitical Studies

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub