How Did Britain Democratize? Views from the Sovereign Bond Market
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5752976 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aditya Dasgupta (0000-0002-5566-3448, Harvard University), Daniel Ziblatt (0000-0002-3401-6567, Harvard University) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-29 |
| Publication date | 2015-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022050715000017 |
| OpenAlex | W2100085991 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 39 |
To assess competing theories of democratization, we analyze British sovereign bond market responses to the 1832, 1867, and 1884 Reform Acts, and to two failed Chartist agitations for reform. Analyses of high-frequency 3 percent consol yield data and historical financial press suggest three conclusions. First, democratic reform episodes were preceded by increases in perceived political risk, comparable to democratizing episodes in other countries. Second, both democratic reform and repression were followed by yield declines. Third, the source of political risk in Britain was both social unrest and political deadlock. Together, the findings challenge the "Whig" characterization of British democratization as exceptionally risk-free
Bond · Bond market · Deadlock · Democracy · Democratization · Development economics · Economics · Financial system · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sovereignty · Unrest · Yield (engineering) · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Historical Economic and Social Studies · Law · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution
Conservative Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe
Suffrage extension, social identity, and redistribution
So oddly calm
Does the Threat of Overthrow Discipline the Elites? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Landholding Inequality and the Consolidation of Democracy
What we can learn from the early history of sovereign debt
Political shocks and asset prices
Firms and Social Protection
Capital Meets Democracy
How Fiscal Policy Affects Prices
What Motivates an Oligarchic Elite to Democratize? Evidence from the Roll Call Vote on the Great Reform Act of 1832
Social Origins of Dictatorships
Political Order in Changing Societies
Capitalist development and democracy
Polyarchy
The Rise of Financial Capitalism
Rational Choice and British Politics
Paths toward Democracy
This Time Is Different
Generalized Additive Models
Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820–1938
Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution
Estimating the Value of Political Connections
Computation and analysis of multiple structural change models
Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"
Elections in Western Europe since 1815
The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy
Capitalist Development and Democracy
The Politics of Collective Violence
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional Watershed
Constitutions and Commitment
Pitfalls in the Estimation of the Yield on British Consols, 1850–1914
A Revolution for Socialist Reforms
The Politics of Democracy
Weak-Form Efficiency in the Nineteenth Century
Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834
How Did Europe Democratize
Channeling the “Restless Spirit of Innovation
Inequality and Democratization
Beyond Linearity by Default
Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions
Political risk and the international bond market between the 1848 revolution and the outbreak of the First World War1
Resource Mobilization and Social Movements
States and Social Revolutions
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,18 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |