The Evolution of Bank Supervisory Institutions
Evidence from American States
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5753293 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kris James Mitchener (Santa Clara University), Matthew Jaremski (Colgate University) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 819-859 |
| Publication date | 2015-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022050715001126 |
| OpenAlex | W1848025899 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 29 |
We use a novel data set spanning 1820-1910 to assess the factors leading to the creation of formal bank supervisory institutions across American states. We show that it took more than a century for all states to create separate agencies tasked with monitoring the safety and soundness of banks. State legislatures initially pursued cheaper regulatory alternatives, such as double liability laws; however, banking distress at the state level as well as the structural shift from note-issuing to deposit-taking commercial banks and competition with national banks propelled policymakers to adopt costly and permanent supervisory institutions
Business · Competition (biology) · Financial distress · Financial system · Legislature · Liability · Political science · Soundness · State (computer science) · Accounting · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Economic, financial, and policy analysis · Housing Market and Economics · Law
Insider Lending
Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting
Theories of Economic Regulation
The Theory of Economic Regulation
The Panic of 1857
Banks, Kinship, and Economic Development
The Development of the National Money Market, 1893-1911
Federal Policy, Banking Market Structure, and Capital Mobilization in the United States, 1863–1913
Resolving the puzzle of the underissuance of national bank notes
Fear and greed
Does “skin in the game” reduce risk taking? Leverage, liability and the long-run consequences of new deal banking reforms
The Investment Market, 1870-1914
Bank Supervision, Regulation, and Instability During the Great Depression
Supervision and Control of Virginia State Banks
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,63 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |