Bad Beliefs
Why They Happen to Good People
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5827742 |
|---|---|
| Authors | N Levy (0000-0002-5679-1986, Oxford University Press (United Kingdom), corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Pages | 208 |
| Publication date | 2021-12-09 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Bad Beliefs (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780192895325.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W4200366103 |
| Open Library | OL33955052M |
| ISBN | 9780192895325 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 71 |
| References cited | 149 |
Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We've missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we've failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging-at least usually-changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn't rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency
Agency (philosophy) · Autonomy · Economics · Enlightenment · Epistemology · Order (exchange) · Political science · Positive economics · Rationality · Sociology · Climate Change Communication and Perception · Law · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
AI Personalized Learning and the Risk of Epistemic Consolidation
Is It Virtuous to Love Truth and Hate Falsehood
Believing in Shmeliefs
The skeptical import of motivated reasoning
Vice, Skill, and the Non-Ideal
Non-Ideal Epistemology and Vices of Attention
Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory in Epistemology
Bad beliefs
The (higher-order) evidential significance of attention and trust—comments on Levy’s Bad Beliefs
Nothing about collective irrationalities makes sense except in the light of cooperation
An overview on trust and trustworthiness
A Journey into the Mind
What is left of irrationality
Vaccine hesitancy and the reluctance to “tempt fate”
A tragic coalition of the rational and irrational
Bad beliefs
Misinformation, observational equivalence and the possibility of rationality
In need of the general public’s participation in science
Doing your own research and other impossible acts of epistemic superheroism
Exempting Oneself from Knowing Better. Epistemic Laziness and Conspiracy Theories
Introduction to the Special Issue
Trusting Conspiracy Theories
Against Intellectual Autonomy
No Trespassing! Abandoning the Novice/Expert Problem
Epistemic Libertarian Paternalism
Conspiracy Beliefs and Monothematic Delusions
Epistemic Hypocrisy and Standing to Blame
Betting on Conspiracy
Knowledge About Skepticism
Self‐Trust, Social Roles, and Autonomy
The Ethics and Epistemology of Persuasion
Too humble for words
Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation
Testimonial liberalism and the balance of epistemic goals
Advancing the debate on the consequences of misinformation
How conspiratorial beliefs spread, and how real conspiracies are covered up
Genealogical undermining for conspiracy theories
Distributed Truth-Telling
Nihilistic Distrust
On Meta-Expertise, Dissent and Epistemic Trespassing
Making Sense of Science Denialism
Arrogancia, desconfianza y desafección. Una aproximación desde la epistemología de la virtud
Reflexive Green Nationalism (RGN)
Echo Chambers and Friendship
Manufacturing the Illusion of Epistemic Trustworthiness
What are ‘biohackers’ hacking? Identifying motivations and meaning-making frameworks
Should Hostile Design Be Used To Prevent Begging, Loitering, and Rough Sleeping
Could the Social Studies Curriculum be Expanded for Families
Ideology as modes of being-with
Do conspiracy-theory interventions rest on a mistake
A group identification account of collective epistemic vices
Bad polarization in structurally cohesive communities
Monothematic delusions are misfunctioning beliefs
Higher-order misinformation
Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition
Precedent and rest stop convergence in reflective equilibrium
The case for partisan motivated reasoning
Contrarianism, conspiracy theories, and epistemic forgeries
Virtue environmentalism
Bad social norms rather than bad believers
Taking the public seriously
How to talk back
Violations of Argumentation Standards in Contemporary Debates on Health and Reproductive Rights
The Transmission of Cumulative Cultural Knowledge — Towards a Social Epistemology of Non-Testimonial Cultural Learning
Misplaced Trust in Expertise
How Partisanship Can Moderate the Influence of Communicated Information on the Beliefs of Agents Aiming to Form True Beliefs
On associating (politically) with the unreasonable
Identity-protective reasoning
It’s Our Epistemic Environment, Not Our Attitude Toward Truth, That Matters
On Literary Miracles and Social Credibility
Limen transitus
The Epistemology of Testimony
Not Born Yesterday
Ecological RationalityIntelligence in the World
Trusting What You're Told
Measuring the Prevalence of Questionable Research Practices With Incentives for Truth Telling
Religious credence is not factual belief
Rational imitation in preverbal infants
The misunderstood limits of folk science
The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity
Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task
The Extent and Consequences of P-Hacking in Science
Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief
Ratcheting up the ratchet
Information leakage from logically equivalent frames
Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories
Miserliness in human cognition
Gorillas in our midst
Gorillas in Our Midst
Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults
The hidden structure of overimitation
The moral, epistemic, and mindreading components of children’s vigilance towards deception
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
The Ethics of Nudge
The gateway belief model
Thinking the unthinkable
Judgment under uncertainty
Nothing in Biology Makes Sense except in the Light of Evolution
Models of ecological rationality
Orangutan Cultures and the Evolution of Material Culture
Failure to detect changes to people during a real-world interaction
Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition
Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man
Rationalising Framing Effects
Can Novices Trust Themselves to Choose Trustworthy Experts? Reasons for (Reserved) Optimism
Believing to Belong
Socially adaptive belief
A tribal mind
Skepticism Motivated
Meaning and framing
Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will
I’ll See It When I Believe It
Why Do Irrational Beliefs Mimic Science? The Cultural Evolution of Pseudoscience
Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange
Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk
Philosophy and Climate Science
Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony
Lazy, not biased
The evolution of prestige
Prestige-biased cultural learning
The pivotal role of perceived scientific consensus in acceptance of science
Attitude, Inference, Association
Infotopia How Many Minds Produce Knowledge
Meta-analyses of the determinants and outcomes of belief in climate change
American Conspiracy Theories
In Gods We Trust
Ecological Engineering
In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions
Effects of religious setting on cooperative behavior
Consensus on consensus
Motivated numeracy and active reasoning in a Western European sample
Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government
Ideology, capitalism, and climate
Children's Acceptance of Conflicting Testimony
How Ordinary Cognition Informs Petitionary Prayer
Epistemic Vigilance and the Science/Religion Distinction
You Cannot be Serious
Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics
Cultural evolution in California and Paris
Autonomy, free speech and automatic behaviour
Theological Correctness
Political Position and Social Knowledge
Weaponized Health Communication
Due deference to denialism
The brittleness of expertise and why it matters
Accountability and values in radically collaborative research
Epistemology of Disagreement
Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility
Experts
Inferring the popularity of an opinion from its familiarity
Thinking backward
Infant imitation after a 1-week delay
A Simple Theory of the Survey Response
Convention
Partisan Perceptual Bias and the Information Environment
Telling the Truth about Believing the Lies? Evidence for the Limited Prevalence of Expressive Survey Responding
Global warming" or "climate change
Reactive Devaluation of an “Israeli” vs. “Palestinian” Peace Proposal
Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs (2006)
Against autonomy
The mystery of evangelical Trump support
Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs
Party Elites or Manufactured Doubt? The Informational Context of Climate Change Polarization
Biased assimilation and attitude polarization
Party Over Policy
Motivated skepticism
The unbearable automaticity of being
The Paranoid Style in American Politics Revisited
| Unique citing works | 71 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 17,75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 71 |