Crime, terror and the state in Central Asia

Bibliographic Data

ID5828561
AuthorsD G Lewis (0000-0002-8655-6178, University of Exeter, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume15
Issue3-4
Pages337-356
Publication date2014-06-23
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueGlobal Crime (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1744-0572 • E-ISSN: 1744-0580
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/17440572.2014.927764
OpenAlexW2038502680
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited37

In the case of Central Asia, linkages between crime and terrorism are too complex to be explained through the framework of a 'crime-terror nexus'. This article distinguishes locally embedded militant networks from transnational movements and demonstrates their different linkages to organised crime. Groups categorised as international terrorist actors have limited linkages to organised crime, while locally embedded groups actively seek to control both the moral order and the political economy of their locality. In most cases, however, the most productive relationship for criminal networks is with the state. This 'state-crime nexus' has more analytical utility than a framework that links crime to terrorism, but it suffers from a tendency to sideline other social actors. A research agenda that priorities the local dynamics of interactions between criminal networks, militant ideologies, society and the state is likely to produce more nuanced analysis than an over-reliance on these binary approaches.Keywords: Central Asiaorganised crimeterrorismstatespace Notes1. See, for example: Ciluffo, "Threat Posed"; Shelley and Picarelli, "Methods and Motives"; Dishman, "'Leaderless Nexus"; Makarenko, "Crime, Terror"; Makarenko, Crime-terror Continuum"; Picarelli, "Osama bin Corleone"; and Neumann, "Grievance to Greed."2. Cornell, "Narcotics, Radicalism"; and Makarenko, "Crime, Terror."3. Cornell, "Narcotics Threat."4. Heathershaw and Megoran, "Contesting Danger."5. Howard and Traughber, "New 'Silk Road'," 374.6. Lewis, "Who's Socialising Whom?."7. UN ODC, "Addiction, Crime, Insurgency," 3.8. Weir, "Islamist Gambit."9. BBC Monitoring, "Uzbek Senior MP."10. BBC Monitoring, "CIS Expert"; and BBC Monitoring, "Islamic Group."11. Latypov, "On the Road to 'H'," 1.12. For example, Peters, Seeds of Terror.13. De Danieli, "Counter-narcotics Policies."14. Peyrouse, "Drug Trafficking."15. Lewis, "High Times."16. Jackson, "International Organizations."17. Marat, "State-crime Nexus"; and Marat, "Criminal State of Play."18. De Danieli, "Counter-Narcotics Policies"; and Paoli et al., "Tajikistan."19. Sanderson et al., "From the Ferghana Valley."20. See Horsman, "Themes in Official Discourses."21. Examples extensively documented in Human Rights Watch, "No One Left"; and reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture on Uzbekistan (2003), Kazakhstan (2009) and Kyrgyzstan (2012).22. FIDH, "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation"; and Ilkhamov, "Phenomenology of 'Akromiya'," 47.23. Cornell and Swanstrom, "Eurasian Drug Trade," 12-13.24. O'Malley and Hutchinson, "Crime-terror Nexus?"25. See Brenner, et al., State/space: A Reader.26. Naumkin, Radical Islam; and Sanderson et al., "From the Ferghana Valley."27. Polat and Butkevich, "Unraveling the Mystery."28. McGlinchey, "Making of Militants"; and Ruttig, "Talebs in Tajikistan?"29. See Feldholm, "From the Ferghana Valley"; Steinberg, "Turkish al-Qaeda"; and Wigen, "Islamic Jihad Union."30. See note 19 above.31. Eurasianet 2004, "Karimov Believes"; Murray, "Hazel Blears."32. Zenn, "Terror Networks."33. International Crisis Group, "Kazakhstan: Waiting for Change."34. See note 32 above.35. Balci, "Central Asian Refugees"; and Wigen, "Islamic Jihad Union," 9.36. Steinberg, "German Jihad".37. Cross, "Alleged Uzbek"; and BBC, "France Jails Nine."38. US Department of State, "Whirlpool of Death."39. See note 32 above.40. International Crisis Group, "Kazakhstan: Waiting for Change."41. International Crisis Group, "Kazakhstan: Waiting for Change"; Murray, "Hazel Blears."42. Murray, "Hazel Blears."43. McGlinchey, "Making of Militants."44. Collins, "Ideas, Networks."45. Babadjanov et al., "Islam," 317.46. Karagiannis, Political Islam.47. Babadjanov et al., "Islam," 319.48. Naumkin, Radical Islam, 60.49. Ibid., 69.50. Rotar, Tajikistan.51. International Crisis Group, "Tajikistan's Politics," 10.52. Mahbatsho, "Tajikistan: Mysterious Death."53. Heathershaw and Roche, "Islam and Political Violence," 3.54. Ibid., 5.55. Heathershaw and Roche, "Islam and Political Violence."56. Rashid, Taliban.57. See Cornell, "Narcotics, Radicalism"; Makarenko, "Crime, Terror"; and Picarelli, "Osama bin Corleone?".58. Howard and Traughber, "New Silk Road," 375.59. Makarenko, "Changing Dynamics," 1-2.60. See Babadjanov et al., "Islam"; and Naumkin, "Radical Islam."61. Sanderson et al., "From the Ferghana Valley," 15.62. Roy and Zahab, "Islamist Networks."63. Picarelli, "Osama bin Corleone?".64. For the debate on the nature of these social groupings, see Collins, "Clan Politics"; and Tuncer-Kilavuz, "Political and Social Networks."65. Kupatadze, "Organized Crime," 282.66. Tilly, "War Making," 169.67. On this process in the context of Afghanistan, see Goodhand, "Corrupting or Consolidating".68. Makarenko, "Crime-Terror Continuum," 138.69. Picarelli, "Osama bin Corleone?," 191.70. De Danieli, "Counter-Narcotics Policies"; and Kupatadze, "Organized Crime, Political Transitions."71. Marat, "State-Crime Nexus."72. Kupatadze, "Organized Crime."73. Peyrouse, "Drug-Trafficking."74. Ibid.75. Bailey and Godson, "Organized Crime."76. See note 71 above.77. Kupatadze, "Organized Crime, Political Transitions."78. Mann, "The Sources."79. International Crisis Group, "Cracks in the Marble?."80. US Department of State, "Turkmenistan."81. Cornell and Swanstrom, "Eurasian Drugs Trade," 23.82. U.S. Treasury, "Treasury Imposes Sanctions." See also US Treasury, "Treasury Targets Leading Figures.83. Eurasianet, "Uzbekistan: Olympic Disappointment"; UzDaily.com, "NOC fires Gafur Rakhimov".84. See note 84 above.85. Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues, Organized Crime and States, 3.86. Radnitz, "Weapons of the Wealthy."87. Latham, "Social Sovereignty."88. Lefebvre, Production of Space, 351.89. For discussion of these informal sovereignties, see Stephenson, "Kazan Leviathan"; Davis, "Non-state Armed Actors"; and Rodgers, "State as a Gang".90. Driscoll, "Commitment Problems."91. De Danieli, "Counter-narcotics Policies"; International Crisis Group, "Tajikistan"; and Paoli et al., "Tajikistan."92. See note 15 above.93. Cornell and Swanstrom, "Eurasian Drug Trade"; and US Department of State, "Tajikistan."94. Heathershaw, Post-Conflict Tajikistan, 123.95. International Crisis Group, "Tajikistan's Politics," 2-3.96. Parshin, "Tajikistan"; and Olimova, "Cops and Robbers."97. Heathershaw and Roche, "Islam and Political Violence."98. Zurcher, "Analysis," 3.99. Eurasianet, "Tajikistan."100. Kucera, "Tajiks."101. Rodgers, "State as a Gang."102. See note 44 above.103. See Khamidov, 'The Lessons"; and Heathershaw and Roche, "Islam and Political Violence."Additional informationNotes on contributorsDavid LewisDr David Lewis is a senior lecturer in Politics at the University of Exeter. He has research interests in international politics and security, with a particular focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia

Central asia · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

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