Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5917455 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Jankowski (0000-0003-4230-5374, University of Arizona, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 449-470 |
| Publication date | 1990-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463190002004004 |
| OpenAlex | W2001279821 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 13 |
Iterated playing of noncooperative games can result in full cooperation. Repeated playing of the noncooperative game permits the sucker to punish the initial defector by defecting in subsequent plays. This article shows that many n- person prisoner's dilemma (PD) games have chicken games embedded within them. In addition, positive externalities produce embedded chicken games, as physical coercion does when used to punish defectors. This characteristic has substantial implications for various solutions to iterated PD games. The difficulty encountered in chicken games is that the sucker must punish oneself in order to punish the defector. It is shown that various versions of the folk theorem, such as those by Friedman, Fudenberg and Maskin, and Abreu, do not extend to the chicken games under a number of realistic assumptions. Hence iterated playing by rational, self-interested actors will not result in cooperative behavior. What is needed to induce cooperative solutions is the presence of vengeful personalities who induce the evolution of metanorms
Dilemma · Economics · Game theory · Iterated function · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Prisoner's dilemma · Repeated game · Superrationality · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Game theory with applications to economics
Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
The Logic of Collective Action
The Possibility of Cooperation
From weakest-link to best-shot
The assurance problem in a laboratory market
Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving
Cooperation by Design
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,14 |
| Citation span | 1991 - 1998 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |