Cooperation by Design
Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3407151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William T Bianco (0000-0002-2581-6837, Duke University), Robert H Bates (0000-0003-1926-8114, Duke University) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 133-147 |
| Publication date | 1990-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1963633 |
| OpenAlex | W2097059091 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 40 |
| References cited | 24 |
We return to the analysis of cooperation among interdependent rational individuals. We emphasize the limited impact of iteration (or repeated play) and explore the possibility of an alternative: intervention by rational agents, whom we call leaders. We show that leadership is more significant for initiating cooperation than for sustaining it. In addition, we identify two features of organizations that are critical in determining a leader's ability to initiate and sustain cooperation by structuring the incentives of his followers: the leader's capabilities (information and strategy sets) and reward structure (payoff function
Business · Economics · Function (biology · Incentive · Interdependence · Intervention (counseling · Knowledge management · Microeconomics · Political science · Public relations · Stochastic game · Structuring · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology
Designing Federalism
Political Institutions
Community and the State The Relationship between Normative and Legal Controls
Engineering cooperation
Leadership, entrepreneurship and collective action
Solving the Tenants? Dilemma
Purposes and criteria in network governance evaluation
Governing community forests and the challenge of solving two-level collective action dilemmas—A large-N perspective
Leadership and Trade-Offs Between Social–Ecological Outcomes in Community-Governed Forests
Issue linkage and international cooperation
Economic and Monetary Union
Leaders’ distributional & efficiency effects in collective responses to policy
A Tale of Two Communities
Tenants' Dilemma- On Collective Action in Housing
Housing in game‐theoretical perspective
The effects of centralising electoral management board design
State Structure and Variations in Corporatism
Budgetary Collective Action Problems
Reputation and Cooperation in Voluntary Exchanges
Explaining Swedish Corporatism
Congressional Parties, Fundraising, and Committee Ambition
Organized Interests' Advocacy Behavior in Alliances
(Mis)Using Dyadic Data to Analyze Multilateral Events
Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination
When Supervision Fails to Induce Compliance
Contemporary Theory of Institutions in Perspective
Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making
Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information
The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment
Leading by Example to Protect the Environment
Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance
Donut Shops and Speed Traps
Leadership, Locke, and the Federalist
Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Development Assistance and the Construction of Government-Initiated Community Institutions
Covenants with and without a Sword
Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur
The Long-Run Advantages of Centralization for Collective Action
If Institutions Have Consequences, Why Don't We Hear About Them From Moral Philosophers
Twenty-five Years with The Logic of Collective Action
Game theory with applications to economics
Game Theory and Political Theory
The Rational Peasant
Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma
Reputation and imperfect information
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Moral Hazard in Teams
Sequential Equilibria
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
Corporate culture and economic theory
Collective Action
The Logic of Collective Action
The Possibility of Cooperation
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information
The New Economics of Organization
The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
The rational peasant
| Unique citing works | 40 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,08 |
| Citation span | 1989 - 2021 (33) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 40 |