Leading by Example to Protect the Environment
Do the Costs of Leading Matter
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285899 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eline Van Der Heijden (Tilburg University, corresponding author), Erling Moxnes (0000-0002-1824-4703, University of Bergen) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 307-326 |
| Publication date | 2013-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002712445971 |
| OpenAlex | W2769135572 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 29 |
Environmentalists often urge their home countries to take a leading role in reducing global environmental problems like climate change. A pertinent question is, Will examples set by leading nations influence others to follow suit, and if so, do the costs of leading matter? For instance, will costly domestic reductions have a stronger effect on followers than purchases of cheap emission permits abroad? To investigate these questions, we have conducted two treatments in a public bad experiment in which leaders have different costs of leading. Our findings suggest that higher costs of leading lead to stronger effects of a given leader example. Randomly chosen leaders lead by example and set better examples if it is less costly to do so. Finally, there seems to be a limit to the leader effect and it may decrease over time
Business · Economics · Lead (geology · Public economics · Set (abstract data type · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Effect size benchmarks
Leading-by-example in public goods experiments
Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity
Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas
Assessing the Variation of Formal Military Alliances
Simultaneous and Sequential Contributions to Step-level Public Goods
Experiments in International Relations
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
Public Goods
Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle
Dictator game giving
Why free ride?
Communication and Free‐riding Behavior
Erc
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
Subordinates' endorsement of an allocating leader in a commons dilemma
When and why leaders put themselves first
Autocratic leadership in social dilemmas
Preferences for leadership in social dilemmas
Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information
The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment
Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas
Leadership in social dilemmas
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Covenants with and without a Sword
Cooperation by Design
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,64 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |