Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement for Cartels
Should There Be a Common Approach to Sanctioning Based on the Overcharge Rate
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5928140 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yannis Katsoulacos (0000-0002-0232-1225, Athens University of Economics and Business), Evgenia Motchenkova (0000-0003-2535-4350, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), David Ulph (0000-0003-3171-1270, University of St Andrews) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2019-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Revista de Economia Contemporânea (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1415-9848 • E-ISSN: 1980-5527 |
| Publisher | FapUNIFESP (SciELO) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1590/198055272321 |
| OpenAlex | W2925049060 |
| SciELO | S1415-98482019000200200 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
We review recent theoretical literature pointing to the ineffectiveness, in terms of welfare impact, of currently applied sanctioning regimes for cartels by Competition Authorities (CAs). We then provide a comparison of the regimes taking also into account criteria related to ease of implementation and transparency. We argue the case for switching to a penalty regime, in which the penalty base continues to be the currently dominant penalty base of cartel revenue but in which, in contrast to current practice, the penalty rate is based on the rate commonly estimated in order to calculate damages in private damage claims, that is, the overcharge rate
Cartel · Collusion · Damages · Economics · Enforcement · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Overcharge · Political science · Revenue · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Highly cited | No |
|---|