The social ontology of intentions

Bibliographic Data

ID5966433
AuthorsA Duranti (0000-0001-7880-0356, University of California, Los Angeles, corresponding author)
Year2006
Volume8
Issue1
Pages31-40
Publication date2006-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDiscourse Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1461-4456 • E-ISSN: 1461-7080
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1461445606059548
OpenAlexW2114192985
LanguageEN
Citations received36
References cited23

This article addresses the issue of how to develop a theory of interpretation of social action (discourse included) that takes into consideration culture-specific claims about intentions while simultaneously allowing for a pan-human, universal dimension of intentionality. It is argued that to achieve such a goal, it is necessary to agree on a basic definition of intentionality and on the conditions that allow for its investigation. After briefly discussing the limitations of applying an (English-based) ‘narrow’ notion of intention to the analysis of other languages and cultures, a more general and basic analytic notion of intentionality is proposed, that is, as aboutness (as defined by Husserl). By applying this more general notion of intentionality, we can then examine both the content of intentional acts and the conditions that allow for their study across cultural contexts through ‘bracketing’. This is made possible by the social ontology of intentions, which is what enables the analysis of human conduct and its interpretation. Our methods and hypotheses must be evaluated over and against such an existential premise

Epistemology · Existentialism · Intentionality · Ontology · Premise · Computer Science · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology · Social Psychology · Social Representations and Identity

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