The Importance and Limitation of Epistemic Norms in Political Theory
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6008909 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eva Erman (0000-0001-7096-9157), Niklas Möller |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 352-371 |
| Publication date | 2025-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Studies Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1478-9299 • E-ISSN: 1478-9302 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/14789299241266196 |
| OpenAlex | W4401121529 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 43 |
One recent debate in political theory centers on the question of whether there is a distinctively political normativity. According to an influential view, there is a distinctive set of norms that applies specifically to political actions and decisions, which are not grounded in moral normativity. On one version of this non-moral view, political theory is grounded in epistemic normativity (and thus epistemic norms). Theorists identifying as “radical realists” insist that political theorists do not need any moral normativity (and thus moral norms), because epistemic normativity may provide action-guidance for political theory. In this article, we take our point of departure in a critical analysis of this epistemic version of the non-moral view, with the overall aim of analyzing the importance and limitation of epistemic norms in political theory. We argue that epistemic norms are necessary—since a political theory should not rely on empirical falsities—but not sufficient for a successful account in the political domain. Two claims are made: moral norms are essential in the process of political theorizing, both in the form of pre-epistemic norms and in the form of post-epistemic norms. More specifically, we contend, first, that we need moral norms to identify and justify which practices to study when conducting political theorizing, and second, that we need moral norms to tell us how to act in light of our investigation of warranted and unwarranted beliefs
Epistemology · Moral disengagement · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification
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Rescuing Justice and Equality
Rationality Through Reasoning
Political Norms and Moral Values
Must Realists Be Pessimists About Democracy? Responding to Epistemic and Oligarchic Challenges
Distinctively Political Normativity in Political Realism
The Sources of Political Normativity
How radical is radical realism
Realism and metanormativity
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Political Realism and Epistemic Constraints
Ideal Theory and Action-Guidance
Politics and the Imagination
Philosophy and Real Politics
Practice-dependence and epistemic uncertainty
The radical realist critique of Rawls
Political realism as ideology critique
Consensus, compromise, justice and legitimacy
How practices do not matter
Political realism, legitimacy, and a place for external critique
Raymond Geuss’ radicalization of realism in political theory
What is distinctive of political normativity? From domain view to role view
What distinguishes the practice-dependent approach to justice
Truth and Truthfulness
Being realistic and demanding the impossible
The Place of Plural Voting in Mill's Conception of Representative Government
Principles as Guides
Property, Legitimacy, Ideology
Fact-Centric Political Theory, Three Ways
Getting Realistic About Action-Guidance
Facts and Principles
Two dogmas of liberalism
Political normativity and the functional autonomy of politics
Realism, liberal moralism and a political theory of modus vivendi
Political Legitimacy in the Real Normative World
Resisting Reality
Distinctively political normativity in political theory
Ideology Critique without Morality
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |