The institutional design of funding rules at international organizations
Explaining the transformation in financing the United Nations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6060552 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Erin R Graham (Drexel University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 365-390 |
| Publication date | 2017-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of International Relations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1354-0661 • E-ISSN: 1460-3713 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066116648755 |
| OpenAlex | W2379394191 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 36 |
| References cited | 34 |
What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I investigate this question in the context of the United Nations system, which has undergone a dramatic shift in financing. Long associated with mandatory contributions, the United Nations increasingly relies on voluntary resources earmarked by individual donors. Previous studies have investigated the financing puzzle from a behavioral perspective and have found that wealthy donors use voluntary funding to rein in costs and constrain international organization programs. Providing an alternative theoretical approach, I investigate the financing puzzle from an institutional design perspective. I provide original United Nations funding rule data to demonstrate that it is not only funding practices, but also underlying funding rules, that have changed over time. I theorize how states with favorable views of the United Nations that sought to expand its activities — rather than those that desired to constrain it — had incentives to introduce funding rules that offered more flexibility and control to donors. I test the argument with a longitudinal case study of funding rule design and change at United Nations economic development institutions. The article expands the institutional design literature by integrating funding rules as a consequential design component and provides a novel explanation for changes in United Nations financing
Economics · Incentive · Management · Market economy · Political science · Public economics · International Development and Aid · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Finance
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Pledge and Forget? Testing the Effects of Nato’s Wales Pledge on Defense Investment
Populism’s Challenge to International Institutions
Field Presence and the Performance of Environmental Projects
Home turf
Covid‐19 and Policy Responses by International Organizations
Issue congruence in international organizations
From developing country to superpower? China, power shifts and the United Nations development pillar
Does earmarked funding affect the performance of international organisations
Financiar la cooperación en tiempos de fragmentación
How earmarking has become self‐perpetuating in United Nations development co‐operation
Avoiding disciplinary garbage cans
Small Donors in World Politics
Crisis management in international organisations
Advocacy and Change in International Organizations
Pay to play? Voluntary contributions and national representation in international organizations
Learning from the Commission case
Temporary Voices in Permanent Halls
The long run and the short run
Walking the Walk, Not Talking the Talk
African agency and global orders
Following the Money and the Law
Evading international law
Mandate or Donors? Explaining the UNHCR’s Country-Level Expenditures from 1967 to 2016
Power orchestrates
Multi-bilateral aid for disease control
Which Donors, Which Funds? Bilateral Donors' Choice of Multilateral Funds at the World Bank
Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations
Power, Control, and the Logic of Substitution in Institutional Design
Porous organizational boundaries and associated states
Theorizing the role of executive heads in international organizations
Informal state influence in international organizations
A blessing or a curse? The role of money in shaping international health governance
Migration Governance Through Funding
Multistakeholder Partnerships for Development and the Financialization of Development Assistance
Ruling the World
A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law
Rules for the World
Rethinking Social Inquiry
Democratic memberships in international organizations
Money and multilateralism
The United Nations system under stress
The Origins of Human Rights Regimes
Global Communications and National Power
Gradual Change in International Organisations
Seeking Escape
Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending
The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions
Rational Design
Delegation to International Organizations
The Administration of United Nations Operational Programs
International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations
The Limits of “Rational Design
Before Hegemony
The United States in the United Nations
The Rational Design of International Institutions
The Political Framework of the United Nations' Financial Problems
Private Justice in a Global Economy
Taking Preferences Seriously
Rational design in motion
The Financial Problem of the United Nations
A History of the United Nations Charter
Contracting around International Uncertainty
Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1938
| Unique citing works | 36 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 36 |