The Inspector General
Political Culture and Constraints on Effective Oversight
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6111975 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel L Feldman (0000-0002-1123-2216, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 593-606 |
| Publication date | 2017-11-14 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Integrity (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1558-0989 • E-ISSN: 1099-9922 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10999922.2017.1309187 |
| OpenAlex | W2620404608 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 19 |
Their enabling legislation and mission statements ostensibly charge federal inspectors general in the United States with capacity-building and performance-enhancement as well as compliance-monitoring powers and responsibilities. This article reviews the constraints on those powers. It proposes that American distrust of government both historic and current—the former reflected in the institutional conflict built into the constitutional structure, the latter reflected in survey research data on trust in American government—encourages the compliance-monitoring role of the inspector general (IG) and discourages the capacity-building and performance-enhancement roles. It then reviews studies of China’s recent anticorruption efforts as well as survey research data on popular trust in the government of the People’s Republic of China. It suggests that Chinese trust in government would support capacity-building and performance enhancement but discourage compliance monitoring were China to institute an IG system. It concludes that an IG system could prove beneficial even in a nation with an authoritarian government, albeit in a different way than in a constitutional democracy, and that, in general, political culture helps to determine which aspects of the role an IG will be able to pursue most effectively
Authoritarianism · China · Democracy · Distrust · Law and economics · Legislation · Political culture · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Sociology · Law · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies
Corruption and Development
Comparative Political Systems
The Political Economy of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Africa
The Political Determinants of Ambassadorial Appointments
Rediscovering Principles of Public Administration
Comparative Political Systems
Pulling the Levers
A Chinese Popularity Function
Managerial Values and Accountability Pressures
Chinese Leadership
Doing Well by Doing Good
The Perception of Anti-corruption Efficacy in China
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2023 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |