State Capacity and Terrorism
A Two-Dimensional Approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6121985 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cullen S Hendrix, Cullen Hendrix (0000-0002-6193-5155, corresponding author), Joseph K Young (0000-0001-5727-0026) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 329-363 |
| Publication date | 2014-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Security Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0963-6412 • E-ISSN: 1556-1852 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09636412.2014.905358 |
| OpenAlex | W2027515641 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 48 |
Conventional wisdom suggests that dissident groups use terrorism when they face an overwhelmingly more powerful state, yet attacks in developing countries have predominated in the post-Cold War era, suggesting that terrorism is an increasingly weak state phenomenon. Cross-national studies of terrorism find mixed results for how common measures of state capacity influence terrorism. We argue that these indeterminate findings are due in part to a partial understanding of both what constitutes state capacity and how different aspects of state strength or weakness relate to the propensity of groups to use terrorism. We decompose state capacity into two dimensions that we theorize are particularly relevant to dissident groups: military capacity, or the ability to project conventional military force, and bureaucratic/administrative capacity. Our analysis supports the claim that terrorist attacks are more frequently targeted at states with large, technologically sophisticated militaries but less frequently targeted at states with higher bureaucratic and administrative capacity. We also compare two militarily capable states, France and Russia, that have had different recent experiences with terrorism to help illustrate the causal mechanisms involved. Evidence from our models and cases suggest that states can be capable in different ways, and these various capabilities create differing incentives for using terror as a strategic and tactical tool. ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe authors thank Will Moore, Mike Findley, Keith Darden, Daniel Esser, Jim Piazza, and several anonymous reviewers for thoughtful comments on previous drafts. A version of this article was previously presented at the 2012 Annual Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting in Chicago, Illinois
Bureaucracy · Capacity building · Development economics · Economics · Incentive · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Terrorism · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Terrorists as Rebels
Economic Subversion in Civil Wars
State Capacity and Public Provision in a Socially Fragmented Nation
Topical dynamics of terrorism from a global perspective and a call for action on global risk
School of influence
Of terrorism and revenue
Refugees and rivals
Assessing border walls’ varied impacts on terrorist group diffusion
The local geography of transnational terrorism
Mobilization and Conflict in Multiethnic States
Territorial control in civil wars
Targeted sanctions, resource substitution, and violence against civilians
Military capacity and state-perpetrated killings during internal conflicts
Evaluating the impact of repeated leadership targeting on militant group durability
Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression
The self-defeating game
The Will and the Way
Fighting for survival
Why do some terrorist campaigns escalate to civil wars but others do not
Does might make right or fight? Coercive capacity, democracy, and human rights, 1975 to 2010
U.S. Imet Participation and the Outcome and Duration of Insurgencies
State capacity matters in ‘the middle
Domestic terrorism in the developing world
Willingness, capacities and (non)compliance with human rights norms
Coercive capacity, land reform and political order in Afghanistan
Oil and terrorism
State Control over Telecommunications, Surveillance, and Militant Mobilization
Managing to mitigate abuse
Paying Them to Hate US
Public Administration, Local and Regional Governance, and Domestic Terrorism
When Do States Take the Bait? State Capacity and the Provocation Logic of Terrorism
Civil-Military Relations and Domestic Terrorism
The Ties That Bind
Internally Displaced Populations and Suicide Terrorism
Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgent Targeting of Civilians
Is Terrorism Really a Weapon of the Weak? Debunking the Conventional Wisdom
Armed Conflicts With Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
Don't Bite the Hand that Feeds
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Re-Escalation of Lethal Violence
Money Talks
Do Armed Drones Counter Terrorism, Or Are They Counterproductive? Evidence from Eighteen Countries
The Effect of Terrorism on Income Inequality
Border fortification and legibility
Do Islamic State’s Deadly Attacks Disengage, Deter, or Mobilize Supporters
The Language of Economic Growth
Central banks and civil war termination
Ethnicity, nonviolent protest, and lethal repression in Africa
Words and deeds
| Unique citing works | 48 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,8 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 48 |