The career characteristics of China’s prefectural environmental protection bureau heads with implication for the environmental governance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6153148 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lei Liu (0000-0002-4422-7325, Sichuan University, corresponding author), Tang Lixu (Sichuan University), Rui Liu (0000-0002-1489-731X, Sichuan University), Mingyue Li (0000-0001-8417-5665, Sichuan University) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 212-235 |
| Publication date | 2021-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Chinese Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2381-2354 • E-ISSN: 2381-2346 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/23812346.2021.1943948 |
| OpenAlex | W3192550551 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 26 |
As the direct responsible cadre in China's local environmental management, the role of environmental protection bureau head (EPBH) is both critical and embarrassing. However, the profile of this group of cadres is largely unknown. This paper makes the first attempt to delineate China's prefectural EPBHs and find several distinct features. First, although advocated by the central authority, "be younger" has not been realized in the appointment of EPBH. On the contrary, older candidates have been more favored in recent years. Second, EPBH is primarily a political actor rather than professional actor. However, they have been bearing increasing political pressure due to professional task. Third, county governments and other prefectural departments are the most important sources of EPBH, while for general environmental officials, it is very hard to be promoted as EPBH. Fourth, the promotion chance of EPBH is relatively high and most of them have been promoted to county governments and other prefectural departments. Last, the number of EPBHs removed because of dereliction has increased notably, but only a small fraction was sanctioned for poor and fraud environmental supervision. Finally, corresponding suggestions are proposed to optimize the selection, appointment, and management of EPBH
Business · China · Corporate governance · Economics · Environmental governance · Management · Political science · Politics · Promotion (chess · Task (project management · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Law · Public Administration · Finance
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| Citations per year | 1.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |