The Large Professional Service Firm
A New Force in the Regulative Bargain
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6173816 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Justine Rogers (0000-0003-3396-3455), Dimity Kingsford Smith, John Chellew |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2017-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | University of New South Wales Law Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0313-0096 • E-ISSN: 1839-2881 |
| Publisher | University of New South Wales Law Journal (PUBLISHER • AU) |
| DOI | 10.53637/muxl7004 |
| OpenAlex | W2887798961 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
This article charts the rise of a new force in the regulative bargain: the large organisation or 'professional service firm'. The 'regulative bargain' refers to the bargain, both theoretical and real, between the professions and the state, on behalf of society. Increasingly, these parties actively negotiate the exchange of professional benefits and responsibilities, and how, where and for what purpose these will be allocated and enforced. This bargain is shaped too by the political climate and culture, and the access to the networks within which this agreement takes place. The classic bargain is the grant of self-regulation and other protections to professions in return for the promise of custodianship and advancement of a public good. The main actors here, and those most studied, are the professional associations representing the profession and the regulators representing the state. As we show in this article, these are the bodies that have driven two main models of professional regulation, self-regulation and versions of statutory regulation, respectively, and the meanings of professionalism they support
Business · Law and economics · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Professional association · Project commissioning · Public relations · Publishing · Service (business · Sociology · State (computer science · Statutory law · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Marketing
| Citations per year | 0.29 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2021 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |