Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Testing Murphy's Strategic Model

Assigning the Majority Opinion to the Marginal Justice in the Conference Coalition on the U.S. Supreme Court

Bibliographic Data

ID6179331
AuthorsTheodore S Arrington (University of North Carolina at Charlotte), Saul Brenner (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)
Year2008
Volume36
Issue3
Pages416-432
Publication date2008-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Politics Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1532-673X • E-ISSN: 1552-3373
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1532673x07308357
OpenAlexW2120314072
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited11

Murphy contended that an astute chief justice could assign the majority opinion to the “most moderate member” of the conference coalition, hoping that such an assignment “might prevent defection or even gain adherents.” We discovered that Murphy's model was partially supported with data from the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts. When the conference coalition was larger than minimum winning (mw), assignment of the majority opinion to the marginal justice in the conference coalition was more likely to result in an opinion joined by the other justices in the conference coalition, making it an effective defensive strategy. It may not, however, be a very effective offensive strategy

Economic Justice · Economics · Law and economics · Management · Offensive · Political science · Public relations · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies

  • Strategic Cooperation

    Open Access•Andrew J O’geen, Christopher M Parker•American Politics Research•2015

  • Measuring Case Salience in State Courts of Last Resort

    Open Access•Richard L Vining, Teena Wilhelm•Political Research Quarterly•2011

  • Handbook of small group research.

    A Paul Hare•Handbook of small group research.•1962

  • The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited

    Open Access•Jeffrey A Segal, Harold J Spaeth•Supreme Court and the Attitudinal…•2002

  • An economic theory of democracy

    Anthony Downs•An economic theory of democracy•1985

  • The Theory of Committees and Elections

    Open Access•Duncan Black, Georg Kunze•Theory of Committees and Elections•1986

  • Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999

    Open Access•A D Martins, Andrew D Martin et al.•Political Analysis•2002

  • Increasing the Size of Minimum Winning Original Coalitions on the Warren Court

    Saul Brenner, Timothy M Hagle et al.•Polity•1990

  • A Conditional Model of Opinion Assignment on the Supreme Court

    Open Access•Forrest Maltzman, Paul J Wahlbeck•Political Research Quarterly•2004

  • Measuring Issue Salience

    Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A Segal•American Journal of Political…•2000

Unique citing works2
Citations per year0,13
Citation span2011 - 2015 (5)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae